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ABSTRACT
The Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have become the main contributor in the field of machine learn-
ing (ML). Specifically in the computer vision (CV), there are applications like image and video
classification, object detection and tracking, instance segmentation and visual question answering,
image and video generation are some of the applications from many that DNNs have demonstrated
magnificent progress. To achieve the best performance, the DNNs usually require a large number
of labeled samples, and finding the optimal solution for such complex models with millions of
parameters is a challenging task. It is known that, the data are not uniformly distributed on the
sample space, rather they are residing on a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the ambient
space. In this dissertation, we specifically investigate the effect of manifold assumption on vari-
ous applications in computer vision. First we propose a novel loss sensitive adversarial learning
(LSAL) paradigm in training GAN framework that is built upon the assumption that natural images
are lying on a smooth manifold. It benefits from the geodesic of samples in addition to the distance
of samples in the ambient space to differentiate between real and generated samples. It is also
shown that the discriminator of a GAN model trained based on LSAL paradigm is also successful
in semi-supervised classification of images when the number of labeled images are limited. Then
we propose a novel Capsule projection Network (CapProNet) that models the manifold of data
through the union of subspace capsules in the last layer of a CNN image classifier. The CapProNet
idea has been further extended to the general framework of Subspace Capsule Network that not
only does model the deformation of objects but also parts of objects through the hierarchy of sub-
space capsules layers. We apply the subspace capsule network on the tasks of (semi-) supervised
image classification and also high resolution image generation. Finally, we verify the reliability of
DNN models by investigating the intrinsic properties of the models around the manifold of data to
detect maliciously trained Trojan models.
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Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DNNs) have revolutionized computer vision. New archi-
tectures and training paradigms have been found by researchers to improve the performance of
these models. Image classification and object detection, action recognition, semantic and instance
segmentation are a few applications to name that have drastically benefited from these findings.
In some of these tasks like image classification, deep neural networks even outperform humans.
Despite the outstanding performance, these models cannot generalize well to the unseen poses and
scenarios.
To improve the applicability of deep learning models on real-world scenarios, large-scale datasets
have been gathered and carefully annotated for each task. ImageNet [107] is one of such datasets
that consists of more than a million images carefully labeled to one of the 1000 classes of this
dataset. However, the process of gathering large-scale datasets is usually costly and time consum-
ing. In some cases like medically related datasets, patient privacy should be kept and physicians
and medical experts should be involved in annotating samples which makes the whole process more
complicated. The aforementioned challenges encourage the application of label-free approaches
like unsupervised learning and semi-supervised learning to benefit from abundant unlabeled sam-
ples.
Discriminative tasks are not the only models that indulged in the power of DNNs, generative mod-
els also were significantly improved by using DNNs. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)[39]
have been one of the most successful frameworks for implicit density estimation that allows sam-
pling from high-dimensional distributions that explicit modeling of them is intractable due to high
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Figure 1.1: Sphere is a 2-manifold embedded in R3. It is globally curved but any point on it along
with a small patch around it can be mapped to a circular plane on R2.
dimensionally. Although the GAN framework significantly outperforms other generative models
like Gaussian Mixture Model, Hidden Markov Models, they are notoriously hard to train.
The only common assumption that is applied in all of the above mentioned models; both generative
and discriminative models, is the independent and identically distributed (iid) assumption about
data samples that allows us to benefit from stochastic learning methods and estimators. However,
we also know that high-dimensional data are not uniformly distributed in the space and they often
reside on a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the ambient space. For the sake of clarity we
provide an intuitive definition of manifold. An n-manifold1 is a topological space that is globally
curved but locally it behaves like an n-dim Euclidean space. One of the well-known examples of
manifolds is a sphere in R3 that a small neighborhood around any point on it can be mapped to a
chart in R2.
1An n dimensional manifold is referred to as n-manifold in the math literature
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In this dissertation, we exploit the manifold assumption as one of the critical criteria in computer
vision and formalize it for both discriminative and generative models. The main goal is to directly
incorporate manifold assumption into deep neural architectures to address some of the challenges
of these models.
First, we propose a novel regularized GAN and Loss Sensitive Adversarial Learning [30] (LSAL)
paradigm to train GANs such that they benefit from the geodesic 2 of samples on the manifold as
well as ambient distance to differentiate real images from the fake ones to address the vanishing
gradient problem and stablize the training process of GAN models.
We also propose a novel capsule network framework [142] that approximates the manifold of data
through a group of capsule subspaces. Inspired by the idea of Hinton [51] to use capsule, which is
a group of neurons, instead of a single neuron, we introduce Capsule Projection Networks. In our
work, Instead of collapsing the high-dimensional features learned by a deep neural network on to
1-dim direction learned for each class, we model each entity by a capsule subspace.
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the schematic visualization of this idea. Hand-written digits of 5 classes
that reside on the manifoldM are modeled by 5 capsule subspaces. Then to label the input image,
the capsule can be found by orthogonal projection of input feature onto the learned subspaces.
So in this framework the manifold of data is estimated by the union of linear subspaces. Now,
one can adopt the principle of separating the presence of an entity and its instantiation parameters
into capsule length and orientation, respectively. In particular, we use the lengths of capsules to
score the presence of entity classes corresponding to different subspaces, while their orientations
are used to instantiate the parameters of entity properties such as poses, scales, deformations and
textures. In this way, one can use the capsule length to achieve the intra-class invariance in detect-
ing the presence of an entity against appearance variations, as well as model the equivalence of the
2Is the shortest path between two points on a curved surface
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Figure 1.2: ManifoldM of hand-writen digits of 5 classes is modeled by 5 capsule subspaces, one
correspond to each digit
instantiation parameters of entities by encoding them into capsule orientations.
We further extend the capsule projection idea and propose Subspace Capsule Networks [31] which
are general capsule frameworks that benefit from subspace capsules in multiple layers of the net-
work to model the variations in parts of an object as well. We show that this framework can be




1.2.1 Loss Sensitive Adversarial Learning with Manifold Margin
The conventional GAN and its variants can be roughly categorized into two large families: un-
regularized versus regularized. By relaxing the non-parametric assumption on the discriminator
in the classic GAN, the regularized GANs have better generalization ability to produce new sam-
ples drawn from the real distribution. It is well known that the real data like natural images are
not uniformly distributed over the whole data space. Instead, they are often restricted to a low-
dimensional manifold of the ambient space. Such a manifold assumption suggests the distance
over the manifold should be a better measure to characterize the distinction between real and fake
samples. Thus, we define a pullback operator to map samples back to their data manifold, and de-
fine a manifold margin as the distance between the pullback representations to distinguish between
real and fake samples and to learn the optimal generators. We theoretically justify the distribu-
tional consistency between the generated samples and real ones and empirically demonstrate the
superiority of the proposed regularaized GAN in generating higher-quality images.
The discriminator of the proposed regularized GAN trained based on LSAL paradigm is also used
for semi-supervised classification of natural images to benefit from abundant un-label images and
reduce the cost of dataset creation.
1.2.2 CapProNet: Deep Feature Learning via Orthogonal Projections onto Capsule Subspaces
In our proposed Capsule Projection networks, the manifold assumption is introduced in the struc-
ture of the last layer of discriminative models. We formalize the idea behind capsule nets, which is
based on using a capsule vector rather than a neuron activation to predict the label of samples. To
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this end, we propose to learn a group of capsule subspaces onto which an input feature vector is
projected. Then the lengths of resultant capsules are used to score the probability of belonging to
different classes. We train such a Capsule Projection Network (CapProNet) by learning an orthog-
onal projection matrix for each capsule subspace, and show that each capsule subspace is updated
until it contains input feature vectors corresponding to the associated class. We will also show that
the capsule projection can be viewed as normalizing the multiple columns of the weight matrix
simultaneously to form an orthogonal basis, which makes it more effective in incorporating novel
components of input features to update capsule representations. In other words, the capsule projec-
tion can be viewed as a multi-dimensional weight normalization in capsule subspaces, where the
conventional weight normalization is simply a special case of the capsule projection onto 1D lines.
Only a small negligible computing overhead is incurred to train the network in low-dimensional
capsule subspaces or through an alternative hyper-power iteration to estimate the normalization
matrix. Experimental results on image datasets show the presented model can greatly improve the
performance of the state-of-the-art ResNet back-bones by 10 − 20% and that of the Densenet by
5 − 7 %, respectively, at the same level of computing and memory expenses. The CapProNet
establishes the competitive state-of-the-art performance for the family of capsule nets by signifi-
cantly reducing test errors on the benchmark datasets.
1.2.3 Subspace Capsule Networks
In subspace capsule networks, not only the object variations are modeled through capsule sub-
spaces, but also are the variations in the parts of objects modeled through a sequence of subspace
capsule layers. In this context, the object variations that consist of appearance, pose, texture, and
deformation or an implicitly defined feature of an object and data manifold are used interchange-
ably.
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The ability of a SCN in modeling variations of features and appearance through a group of sub-
spaces, makes it a proper candidate for generative models as well as discriminative models. When
applied in a discriminative model, a SCN seeks to get in-variance with respect to the possible de-
formation and variations in the appearance of an entity, by separating the presence of an entity and
its instantiation parameters into capsule length and capsule orientation. In a generative model, like
GAN, a SCN tries to select the best instantiation parameters from the pool of possible deforma-
tions in the appearance of an entity modeled by the capsule subspace. For instance, if the goal is
to generate images of human faces, and a capsule subspace models different nose shapes, a SCN
selects the one that best fits the general structure of face, and also places it at the right position.
As a general framework we investigate the power of SCNs in three tasks of high-resolution image
generation, semi-supervised image classification through GAN, and supervised image classifica-
tion.
1.2.4 Odyssey: Creation, Analysis and Detection pf Trojan Models
In this research we investigate the effect of Trojan insertion process on the intrinsic properties of
deep models around the manifold of clean data [29]. To this end we first create Odysseus, one of
the largest Trojan dataset with more than 3000 high performance models. We investigate the effect
of various factors in creating a successful Trojan model like trigger size, poisoning ration and label
mapping of source to target label. Our analysis on Odysseus reveals that Trojaning process affects
the classifier margin. It also create a dominant direction in the perturbation space that moving along
that direction with fixed magnitude causes more performance loss compared to clean models. In
other word, Trojaning process make a model more adversarially vulnerable compared to clean
models. Based on this finding we propose a novel Trojan detector algorithm that unlike the other
methods does not work based on unrealistic assumption about attack like knowing the trigger size,
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or having access to poisoned data. It only requires a limited number of clean samples with no
assumption about the Trojan attack.
1.3 Organization
In Chapter 2 we review the literature on generative adversarial networks (GANs) and their ap-
plication on image generation and semi-supervised classification followed by introducing capsule
network framework and its variants. In Chapter 3, we present the novel loss sensitive adverserial
learning paradigm to address the challenge of unstable training of GANs. In Chapter 4, the novel
Capsule projection network is introduced and Chapter 5 elaborates the novel subspace capsule net-
work framework and its application on both generative and discirminative tasks. In Chapter 6, we
present Odysseus, one of the most diverse Trojan dataset and we invertigate the effect of the back-
door attack on the model properties. Based on our findings, we propose a novel Trojan detector
that achieves state of the art performance on multiple datasets with only limitted clean data. In
Chapter 7, we conclude this thesis by discussing about future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
The Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are one of the most successful methods in implicitly
estimating a data distribution Px. The implicit estimation means that, the model can generate a
sample from Px but can not produce the likelihood of that sample. The framework consists of 2
players, namely a generator G and a discirminator D that adversarialy compete against each other
in a game theoretic fashion. Game theory has a lot of applications in system science and computer
science [46]. The generator G aims to generate high quality samples that can fool D and the
discriminator D tries to differentiate between real and fake samples. The generator G generates
a sample x′ by mapping a low dimensional latent representation from a known distribution; like
normal or uniform distributions; to the high dimesional sample space. The original GAN [39,
102, 110] can be viewed as the most classic unregularized GAN with its discriminator based on
a non-parametric assumption of infinite modeling ability. Since then, great research efforts have
been made to efficiently train the GAN by different criteria and architectures [104, 123, 115].
For example, [144] presents an energy-based GAN by minimizing an energy function to learn an
optimal discriminator, and an auto-encoder structured discriminator is presented to compute the
energy. [17] presents another information-theoretic GAN to learn disentangled representations
capturing various latent concepts and factors in generating samples.
In contrast to unregularized GANs, Loss-Sensitive GAN (LS-GAN) [100] was presented to reg-
ularize the learning of a loss function in a Lipschitz space, and proved the generalizability of the
resultant generator. In [7], authors proposed to minimize the Earth-Mover distance between the
density of generated samples and the true data density, and they showed that the resultant Wasser-
stein GAN (WGAN) can address the vanishing gradient problem that the classic GAN suffers from.
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The learning of WGAN is also constrained in a Lipschitz space. In another attempt, [91] proposes
a new weight normalization technique called spectral normalization to control Lipschitz constant
of the discriminator.
There are also many efforts that combine the power of regularized GAN with architectural modifi-
cations that lead to significant improvement in generating high-quality outputs. Zhang et al. [141]
use self-attention mechanism in generator on top of applying spectral normalization both in gener-
ator and discriminator. In ProgressiveGAN [64], the framework is trained in a progressive fashion.
The generator and discriminator try to master a specific resolution of image before enlarging it
twice in height and width and fine tuning the whole architecture based on the new scale. BigGAN
[14] is one of the most successful attempts in generating high resolution and high quality images
from the diverse classes of ImageNet[107] data using a single huge architecture. While the overall
architecture is similar to SN [91] method, but the authors show that by increasing the batch size
during training and generator and discriminator capacity the current GAN framework is capable of
producing very good samples.
There have been another groups of GAN [25, 28] that try to learn a generator along with a cor-
responding encoder to obtain the representation of input data. The generator and encoder are
simultaneously learned by jointly distinguishing between not only real and generated samples but
also their latent variables in an adversarial process. Beside image generation, there are many other
applications that use GAN framework, like image to image translation [147, 57], image super-
resolution [131, 75].
Researchers also leverage the learned representations by deep generative networks to improve the
classification accuracy when it is too difficult or expensive to label sufficient training examples. For
example, [65] presents variational auto-encoders [66] by combining deep generative models and
approximate variational inference to explore both labeled and unlabeled data. [110] treats the sam-
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ples from the GAN generator as a new class, and explore unlabeled examples by assigning them to
a class different from the new one. [104] proposes to train a ladder network [123] by minimizing
the sum of supervised and unsupervised cost functions through back-propagation, which avoids
the conventional layer-wise pre-training approach. [115] presents an approach to learn a discrimi-
native classifier by trading-off mutual information between observed examples and their predicted
classes against an adversarial generative model. [28] seeks to jointly distinguish between not only
real and generated samples but also their latent variables in an adversarial process. These methods
have shown promising results for classification tasks by leveraging deep generative models.
2.2 Subspace Capsule Network
The idea of capsule networks was first introduced in Transforming auto-encoders[51], where Hin-
ton et al. pointed out that CNNs cannot achieve viewpoint invariance just by looking at the activity
of a single neuron, and a more complex structure like a capsule is necessary. Output of a capsule
is a vector that summarizes information about an entity or part of that entity. The main advan-
tages of capsule networks is that the part-whole relation can be captured through the capsules of
consecutive layers. [108] defines a capsule as a group of neurons, whose orientation of its output
vector represents the instantiation parameters of a visual entity modeled by that capsule and its
length represents the probability of entity’s existence. They use dynamic routing between capsules
to capture the part-whole relationship. Dynamic routing works based on measuring the agreement
of two capsule in consecutive layers using scalar product of their capsule vectors. The subsequent
paper [52] extends the idea of capsule by separating it into a 4 × 4 pose matrix and an activation
probability. Dynamic routing is updated to EM-routing algorithm, which is a more efficient way
in measuring the agreement between capsules. The new capsule structure leads to the state-of-the-
art performance in classification task of SmallNorb dataset. Many variations of capsule network
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have been introduced so far with the main focus of improving the routing mechanism and memory
bottleneck of early CapsNet architecture.
In [106], authors propose a probabilistic framework that replaces the inefficient local iterative rout-
ing between capsule with a global probabilistic view of part-whole(object) relation. A global latent
variable is introduced and is discriminatively trained based on minimum description length (MDL)
principle to approximate the posterior distribution of part-whole relation. In an other attempt in
improving the dynamic routing, Choi et.al. in [20] replace it with attention routing. This new
routing makes the proposed CapsNet more similar to CNN architecture with attention mechanism.
[68] proposes a capsule based autoencoder for unsupervised classification. This framework con-
sists of two parts. First the input image is segmented by part capsules into parts and their poses.
The poses are then used to reconstruct the input by affine-transforming a group of learned tem-
plates. Then, object capsules try to arrange inferred poses into objects, thereby discovering under-
lying structure. The framework is trained by maximizing image and part log-likelihoods subject to
sparsity constraints.
[114] uses capsule idea in low-resolution image recognition. The idea of 3D capsules introduced
in [27] to tackle action detection and localization problem. Capsule network was also applied on
medical image segmentation task by [73] and achieve competitive results based on the convolution-
deconvolution capsule network structure.
The common point among all of these studies is that they all try to solve a discriminative task, like
classification, image segmentation, and action detection using a capsule network. There have been
a few attempts in using the capsule architecture in a generative model. CapsuleGAN [58] applies
capsule network in the discriminator of a GAN to improve the quality of generated samples and
CapsPix2Pix [11] uses convolution capsules to synthesise images conditioned on segmentation
labels to pre-train segmentation models for the medical image segmentation task.
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2.3 Trojan Models
The vulnerability of DNN models, at inference stage is a well studied topic. Challenges like out of
distribution samples [63, 61] and adversarial attacks [62, 72] and incremental learning [89] have
been studied in detail by researchers. Various scenarios of white box[41], black box[19, 77, 10, 33],
targeted [5, 78] and untargeted adversarial attacks [93] have been proposed. Moreover, people have
developed effective defenses such as adversarial training [87, 120], and their variants [126, 140, 96,
125, 133], against these attacks. However, DNNs are also susceptible to attack that happens at the
training phase, known as backdoor or Trojan attacks[81, 18, 42, 135]. These attacks can occur in
many different ways [82, 109, 138, 143, 43, 145, 103], mostly through data poisoning. And there
is a growing interest among researchers in defending these attacks[38, 127, 130, 79, 80, 121].
Methods such as Activation Clustering (AC) [15], STRIP [38], SentiNet [21] and Spectral Signa-
ture (SS) [121] analyze the training data for possible presence of Trojan. To distinguish between
poisoned and clean data, AC [15] applies a two-class clustering over the feature vector of the
training data. STRIP [38] is an online method that assumes Trojan models are input agnostic and
decides whether the input contains a trigger based on the uncertainty of the model prediction on
perturbed inputs. SentiNet [21] looks for the trigger pattern by finding the salient parts in the
image. SS [121] computes a signature for each input data removing the ones showing Trojan be-
havior. However, all of these methods require full access to the training data which is not a practical
assumption.
ABS [80] uses a scanning method to identify the affected neurons that respond to the trigger in
the input data. However, searching over all neurons for finding the compromised ones seems to be
an exhaustive process. Authors of [132, 127, 44] use optimization based method to find possible
triggers that will identify the Trojan behavior in a model. Neural Cleanse (NC) [127] tries to
calculate the minimum modification required to misclassify any input to a fixed target class. It then
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finds such modifications/triggers for all possible target classes. The class with significantly smaller
trigger than all other classes, is believed to be the Trojan label of the backdoor attack. However,
NC requires a lot of input samples and small size triggers to work effectively. DeepInspect [16]
proposes a blackbox detector that combines model inversion techniques and the power of GAN
framework to model the distribution of triggers. Then the actual detection problem is modeled as
an outlier detection. NeuronInspect [56] tries to classify clean and Trojan models based on the
heat-map of the output layer. However, the effectiveness of these methods is only evaluated on the
limited attack scenarios of triggers and model architectures. [101] benefits from MESA sampling
free generative method to recover the distribution of triggers. This method works on localized
triggers and known trigger size, which is not always the case in Trojan attacks.
There are several recent training based methods [55, 67, 136] that have been developed for the pur-
pose of backdoor detection. [55] designs a one-pixel signature representation for characterizing the
nature of a DNN model. ULP [67] optimizes for universal litmus patterns that functions as an indi-
cator whether a model is clean or Trojan. MNTD [136] trains a meta classifier for detecting Trojans
in DNN. However, they all require a large number of clean and Trojan models for their method to
work. Training these models could be computationally intensive and time-consuming. Moreover,
these methods lack powerful generalizability for test models other than their own created ones.
In contrast to these detectors, our proposed detector requires neither a lot of models nor model
training data to work effectively. We have evaluated our detection method in different attack
scenarios, e.g. variable trigger size and location, model architecture, mapping etc. Furthermore, it
is free from any impractical assumption and has proved its efficacy by setting a high accuracy for
multiple public datasets, including the one we proposed.
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CHAPTER 3: GENERALIZED LOSS-SENSITIVE ADVERSARIAL
LEARNING WITH MANIFOLD MARGINS
3.1 Introduction
Since the Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) was proposed by Goodfellow et al. [39], it has at-
tracted much attentions in literature with a number of variants have been proposed to improve its
data generation quality and training stability. In Brief, the GANs attempt to train a generator and a
discriminator that play an adversarial game to mutually improve one another [39]. A discriminator
is trained to distinguish between real and generated (fake) samples as much as possible, while a
generator attempts to generate good samples that can fool the discriminator. Eventually, an equilib-
rium is reached where the generator can produce high quality samples that cannot be distinguished
by a well trained discriminator.
The classic GAN and its variants can be roughly categorized into two large families: the unregu-
larized versus regularized GANs. The former contains the original GAN and many variants [144],
where the consistency between the distribution of their generated samples and real data is estab-
lished based on the non-parametric assumption that their discriminators have infinite modeling
ability. In other words, the unregularized GANs assume the discriminator can take an arbitrary
form so that the generator can produce samples following any given distribution of real samples.
On the contrary, the regularized GANs focus on some regularity conditions on the underlying
distribution of real data, and it has some constraints on the discriminators to control their modeling
abilities. The two most representative models in this category are Loss-Sensitive GAN (LS-GAN)
[100] and Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [7]. Both are enforcing the Lipschitz constraint on training
their discriminators. Moreover, it has been shown that the Lipschitz regularization on the loss
15
function of the LS-GAN yields a generator that can produce samples distributed according to any
Lipschitz density, which is a regularized form of distribution on the support manifold of real data.
Compared with the family of unregularized GANs, the regularized GANs sacrifice their ability to
generate an unconstrained distribution of samples for better training stability and generalization
performances. For examples, both LS-GAN and WGAN can produce uncollapsed natural im-
ages without involving batch-normalization layers, and both address vanishing gradient problem
in training their generators. Moreover, the generalizability of the LS-GAN has also been proved
with the Lipschitz regularity condition, showing the model can generalize to produce data follow-
ing the real density with only a reasonable number of training examples that are polynomial in
model complexity. In other words, the generalizability asserts the model will not be overfitted
to merely memorize training examples; instead it will be able to extrapolate to produce unseen
examples beyond provided real examples.
Although the regularized GANs, in particular LS-GAN [100] have shown compelling perfor-
mances, there are still some unaddressed problem. To train the loss function, the LS-GAN defines
a margin to separate the loss functions between the real and generated samples. The loss of a real
sample should be smaller than the loss of a fake sample by at least a margin that is a function of
distance between the two samples. While the margin-based constraint on training the loss function
is intuitive, directly using the ambient distance as the loss margin may not accurately reflect the
dissimilarity between data points.
It is well known that the real data like natural images do not uniformly distribute over the whole
data space. Instead, they are often restricted to a low-dimensional manifold of the ambient space.
Such manifold assumption suggests the “geodesic” distance over the manifold should be a better
measure of the margin to separate the loss functions between real and fake examples. For this
purpose, we will define a pullback mapping that can invert the generator function by mapping a
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sample back to the data manifold. Then a manifold margin is defined as the distance between the
representation of data points on the manifold to approximate their distance. The loss function,
the generator and the pullback mapping are jointly learned by a threefold adversarial game. We
will prove that the fixed point characterized by this game will be able to yield a generator that can
produce samples following the real distribution of samples.
3.2 The Formulation
3.2.1 Loss Functions and Margins
The Loss-Sensitive Adversarial Learning (LSAL) aims to generate data by learning a generator G
that transforms a latent vector z ∈ Z of random variables drawn from a distribution PZ(z) to a
real sample x , G(z) ∈ X , where Z and X are the noise and data spaces respectively. zUsually,
the space Z is of a lower dimensionality than X , and the generator mapping G can be considered
as an embedding of Z into a low-dimensional manifold G(Z) ⊂ X . In this sense, each z can be
considered as a compact representation of G(z) ∈ X on the manifold G(Z).
Then, we can define a loss function L over the data domainX to characterize if a sample x is real or
not. The smaller the loss L, the more likely x is a real sample. To learn L, a margin ∆x(x,x′) that
measures the dissimilarity between samples will be defined to separate the loss functions between
a pair of samples x and x′, so that the loss of a real sample should be smaller than that of a fake
sample x′ by at least ∆x(x,x′). Since the margin ∆x(x,x′) is defined over the samples in their
original ambient space X directly, we called it ambient margin.
In the meantime, we can also define a manifold margin ∆z(z, z′) over the manifold representations
to separate the losses between real and generated samples. This is because the ambient margin
alone may not well reflect the difference between samples, in particular considering real data like
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natural images often only occupy a small low-dimensional manifold embedded in the ambient
space. Alternatively, the manifold will better capture the difference between data points to separate
their losses on the manifold of real data.
To this end, we propose to learn another pullback mapping Q that can project a data sample x back
to the latent vector z , Q(x) that can be viewed as the low-dimensional representation of x over
the underlying data manifold. Then, we can use the distance ∆z(z, z′) between latent vectors to
approximate the geodesic distance between the projected points on the data manifold, and use it to
define the manifold margin to separate the loss functions of different data points.
3.2.2 Learning Objectives
Formally, let us consider a loss function L(x, z) defined over a joint space X ×Z of data and latent
vectors. For a real sample x and its corresponding latent vector Q(x), its loss function L(x, Q(x))
should be smaller than L(G(z), z) of a fake sample G(z) and its latent vector z. The required
margin between them is defined as a combination of margins over data samples and latent vectors
∆µ,ν(x, z) , µ∆x(x, G(z)) + ν∆z(Q(x), z) (3.1)
where the first term is the ambient margin separating loss functions between data points in the
ambient space X , while the second term is the manifold margin that separates loss functions
based on the distance between latent vectors.
When a generated sample is far away from a real sample, a larger margin will be imposed between
them to separate their losses; otherwise, a smaller margin will be used to separate the losses. This
allows the model to focus on improving the poor samples that are still far away from real samples,
instead of wasting efforts on improving those well-generated data that are already close to real
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examples.
Then we will use the following objective functions to learn the fixed points of loss function L∗, the
generator G∗ and the pullback mapping Q∗ by solving the following optimization problems.
(I) Learning L with fixed G∗ and Q∗:
L∗ = arg min
L
S(L,G∗, Q∗) , Ex,z C
[
∆µ,ν(x, z) + L(x, Q
∗(x))− L(G∗(z), z)
]
(II) Learning G with fixed L∗ and Q∗:
G∗ = arg min
G
T (L∗, G,Q∗) , Ez L∗(G(z), z))
(III) Learning Q with fixed L∗ and G∗:
Q∗ = arg max
Q
R(L∗, G∗, Q) , Ex L∗(x, Q(x))
where 1) the expectations in the above three objective functions are taken with respect to (wrt) the
probability measure PX of real samples x and/or the probability measure PZ of latent vectors z.
2) the function C[·] is the cost function measuring the degree of the loss function L violating the
required margin ∆µ,ν(x, z), and it should satisfy the following two conditions:
C[a] = a for a ≥ 0, and C[a] ≥ a for any a ∈ R.
For example, the hinge loss [a]+ = max(0, a) satisfies these two conditions, and it results in
a LSAL model by penalizing the violation of margin requirement. Any rectifier linear function
ReLU(a) = max(a, ηa) with a slope η ≤ 1 also satisfies these two conditions.
Later on, we will prove the LSAL model satisfying these two conditions can produce samples
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following the true distribution of real data, i.e., the distributional consistency between real and
generated samples.
3) Problem (II) and (III) learn the generator G and pullback mapping Q in an adversarial fashion:
G is learned by minimizing the loss function L∗ since real samples and their latent vectors should
have a smaller loss. In contrast, Q is learned by maximizing the loss function L∗ – the reason will
become clear in the theoretical justification of the following section when proving the distributional
consistency between real and generated samples.
3.3 Theoretical Justification
In this section, we will justify the learning objectives of the proposed LSAL model by proving the
distributional consistency between real and generated samples.
Formally, we will show that the joint distribution PGZ(x, z) = PZ(z)PX|Z(x|z) of generated sam-
ple x = G(z) and the latent vector z matches the joint distribution PQX(x, z) = PX(x)PZ|X(z|x)
of the real sample x and its latent vector z = Q(x), i.e., PGZ = PQX . Then, by marginalizing out z,
we will be able to show the marginal distribution PGZ(x) =
∫
x
PGZ(x, z)dz of generated samples
is consistent with PX(x) of the real samples. Hence, the main result justifying the distributional
consistency for the LSAL model is Theorem 2 below.
3.3.1 Auxiliary Functions and their Property









where PGQ = PGZ + PQX , and the above two derivatives defining the auxiliary functions are the
Radon-Nikodym derivative that exists since PQX and PGZ are absolutely continuous with respect
to PGQ. Here, we will need the following property regarding these two functions in our theoretical
justification.
Lemma 1. If fQX(x, z) ≥ fGZ(x, z) for PGQ-almost everywhere, we must have PGZ = PQX .


























Similarly, we can show the following inequality on Ω \R with Ω = X × Z
PQX(Ω \R) ≥ PGZ(Ω \R).
Since PQX(R) = 1− PQX(Ω \R) and PGZ(R) = 1− PGZ(Ω \R), we have
PQX(R) = 1− PQX(Ω \R) ≤ 1− PGZ(Ω \R) = PGZ(R). (3.4)
Putting together Eq. (3.3) and (3.4), we have PQX(R) = PGZ(R) for an arbitrary R, and thus
PQX = PGZ , which completes the proof.
3.3.2 Main Result on Consistency
Now we can prove the consistency between generated and real samples with the following Lips-
chitz regularity condition on fQX and fGZ .
Assumption 1. Both fQX(x, z) and fGZ(x, z) have bounded Lipschitz constants in (x, z).
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It is noted that the bounded Lipschitz condition for both functions is only applied to the support of
(x, z). In other words, if samples x and their latent vectors z reside on a manifoldMx andMz in
their respective ambient space, we only require the Lipschitz condition hold on the joint manifold
Mx ×Mz.
Then, we can prove the following main theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, PQX = PGZ for PGQ-almost everywhere with the optimal gen-




The second part of the theorem follows from the first part. since PQX = PGZ for the optimum G∗









. Similarly, fGZ =
1
2
. This shows fQX and fGZ are
both Lipschitz at the fixed point depicted by Problem (I)-(III).
Here we give the proof of this theorem step-by-step in detail. The proof will shed us some light on
the roles of the ambient and manifold margins as well as the Lipschitz regularity in guaranteeing
the distributional consistency between generated and real samples.
Proof. Step 1: First, we will show that
S(L∗, G∗, Q∗) ≥ Ex,z[∆∗µ,ν(x, z)], (3.5)
where ∆∗µ,ν(x, z) is defined in Eq. (3.1) with G and Q being replaced with their optimum G
∗ and
Q∗.
This can be proved following the deduction below
S(L∗, G∗, Q∗) ≥ Ex,z[∆∗µ,ν(x, z)] + ExL∗(x, Q∗(x))− EzL∗(G∗(z), z)
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which follows from the Problem (II) and (III) where G∗ and Q∗ minimizes and maximizes L∗ re-
spectively. Hence, the second and third terms in the LHS are lower bounded when PZ|X(z = Q∗(x)|x)
and PX|Z(x = G∗(z)|z) are replaced with PZ(z) and PX(x) respectively.
Step 2: we will show that fQX ≥ fGZ for PGQ-almost everywhere so that we can apply Lemma 1
to prove the consistency.
With Assumption 1, we can define the following Lipschitz continuous loss function
L(x, z) = α[−fQX(x, z) + fGZ(x, z)]+ (3.6)
with a sufficiently small α > 0. Thus, L(x, z) will also be Lipschitz continuous whose Lips-
chitz constants are smaller than µ and ν in x and z respectively. This will result in the following
inequality
∆∗µ,ν(x, z) + L(x, Q
∗(x))− L(G∗(z), z) ≥ 0.
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Then, by C[a] = a for a ≥ 0, we have







= Ex,z[∆∗µ,ν(x, z)] +
∫
x,z




where the last equality follows from Eq. (3.2). By substituting (3.6) into the RHS of the above
equality, we have
S(L,Q∗, G∗) = Ex,z[∆∗µ,ν(x, z)]− α
∫
x,z
[−fQX(x, z) + fGZ(x, z)]2+dPGQ
Let us assume that fQX(x, z) < fGZ(x, z) holds on a subset (x, z) of nonzero measure with respect
to PGQ. Then since α > 0, we have
S(L∗, Q∗, G∗) ≤ S(L,Q∗, G∗) < Ex,z[∆∗µ,ν(x, z)]
The first inequality arises from Problem (I) where L∗ minimizes S(L,Q∗, G∗). Obviously, this
contradicts with (3.5), thus we must have fQX(x, z) ≥ fGZ(x, z) for PGQ-almost everywhere.
This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: Now the theorem can be proved by combining Lemma 1 and the result from Step 2.
As a corollary, we can show that the optimal Q∗ and G∗ are mutually inverse.
Corollary 1. With optimal Q∗ and G∗, Q∗−1 = G almost everywhere. In other words, Q∗(G∗(z))
for PZ-almost every z ∈ Z and G∗(Q∗(x)) = x for PX-almost every x ∈ X .
The corollary is a consequence of the proved distributional consistency PQX = PGZ for optimal
Q∗ and G∗ as shown in [25]. This implies that the optimal pullback mapping Q∗(x) forms a latent
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representation of x as the inverse of the optimal generator function G∗.
3.4 Semi-Supervised Learning
LSAL can also be used to train a semi-supervised classifier by exploring a large amount of un-
labeled examples when the labeled samples are scarce. To serve as a classifier, the loss function
L(x, z,y) can be redefined over a joint space of X × Z × Y where Y is the label space. Now
the loss function measures the cost of assigning jointly a sample x and its manifold representation
Q(x) to a label y∗ by minimizing L(x, z,y) over Y below
y∗ = arg min
y∈Y
L(x, z,y) (3.7)
To train the Loss function of LSAL in a semi-supervised fashion, We define the following objective
function
S(L,G,Q) = Sl(L,G,Q) + λ Su(L,G,Q) (3.8)
where Sl is the objective function for labeled examples while Su is for unlabeled samples, and λ is
a positive coefficient balancing between the contributions of labeled and unlabeled data.
Since our goal is to classify a pair of (x, Q(x)) to one class in the label space Y , we can define the
loss function L by the negative log-softmax output from a network. So we have
L(x, z,y) = − log exp(ay(x, z))∑
y′ exp(ay′(x, z))
which ay(x, z) is the activation output of class y. By the LSAL formulation, given a label example
(x,y), the L(x, Q(x),y) should be smaller than L(G(z), z,y) by at least a margin of ∆µ,ν(x, z).
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So the objective Sl is defined as
Sl(L,G∗, Q∗) , Ex,z,y C
[




For the unlabeled samples, we rely on the fact that the best guess of the label for a sample x is the
one that minimizes L(x, z,y) over the label space y ∈ Y . So the loss function for an unlabeled
sample can be defined as
Lu(x, z) , min
y
L(x, z,y) (3.10)




. Equipped with the new Lu, we can define
the loss-sensitive objective for unlabeled samples as
Su(L,G∗, Q∗) , Ex,z,y C
[
∆µ,ν(x, z) + Lu(x, Q
∗(x),y)− Lu(G∗(z), z,y)
]
Like in the LSAL, G∗ and Q∗ can be found by solving the following optimization problems.
• Learning G with fixed L∗ and Q∗:
G∗ = arg min
G
T (L∗, G,Q∗) , Ez,y L∗u(G(z), z) + L∗(G(z), z,y)
• Learning Q with fixed L∗ and G∗:
Q∗ = arg max
Q
R(L∗, G∗, Q) , Ex,y L∗u(x, Q(x)) + L∗(x, Q(x),y)
In experiments, we will evaluate the semi-supervised LSAL model in image classification task.
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(a) LSAL (b) DC-GAN
(c) LS-GAN (d) BEGAN
Figure 3.1: Generated samples by various methods. Size 64 × 64 on CelebA data-set. Best seen
on screen.
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Figure 3.2: Network architecture for the loss function L(x, z). All convolution layers have a stride
of two to halve the size of their input feature maps.
3.5 Experiments
We evaluated the performance of the LSAL model on four datasets, namely Cifar10 [69], SVHN
[94], CelebA [137] and 64×64 cropped center ImageNet [107]. We compared the image generation
ability of the LSAL, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with other state-of-the-art GAN models.
We also assessed the inherent representation learning ability of the pullback mappingQ and trained
LSAL model in semi-supervised fashion for image classification task.
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3.5.1 Architecture and training
While this work does not aim to test new idea of designing architectures for the GANs, we adopt
the exisiting architectures to make the comparison with other models as fair as possible. Three
convnet models have been used to represent the generator G(z), the pullback mapping Q(x) and
the loss function L(x, z). We use hinge loss as our cost function C[·] = max(0, ·). Similar
to DCGAN [102], we use strided-convolutions instead of pooling layers to down-sample feature
maps and fractional-convolutions for the up-sampling purpose. Batch-normalization (BN) also
has been used before Rectified Linear (ReLU) activation function in the generator and pullback
mapping networks while weight-normalization (WN) is applied to the convolutional layers of the
loss function. We also apply the dropout with a ratio of 0.2 over all fully connected layers. The
loss function L(x, z) is computed over the joint space X × Z , so its input consists of two parts:
the first part is a convnet that maps an input image x to an n-dim vector representation; the second
part is a sequence of fully connected layers that successively maps the latent vector z to an m-dim
vector too. Then an (n + m)-dim vector is generated by concatenation of these two vectors and
goes further through a sequence of fully connected layers to compute the final loss value. For more
details about the architecture of net For the semi-supervised LSAL, the loss function L(x, z,y) is
also defined over the label space Y . In this case, the loss function network defined above can have
multiple outputs, each for one label in Y . The main idea of loss function network is illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
The Adam optimizer has been used to train all of the models on four datasets. For image generation
task, we used the learning rate of 10−4 and the first and second moment decay rate of β1 = 0.5
and β2 = 0.99. In the semi-supervised classification task, for both Cifar10 and SVHN datasets,
λ, the coefficient of the unlabeled samples is set to 1. The learning rate is set to 6 × 10−4 and
decayed by 5% every 50 epochs till it reaches 3× 10−4. The hyper parameters µ and ν are chosen
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on the validation set of each dataset. Table 3.1 shows the coefficients of the ambient margin, µ,
and the manifold margin, ν, used in training of each dataset. The L1-norm has been used in all of
the experiments for both manifold and ambient margins.
We would like to emphasize on this fact that based on the formulation of LSAL, in the training
process there is no need to do any kind of pairing between real and generated samples and each
batch of real images are chosen randomly from training data.
3.5.2 Image Generation Results
Qualitative comparison: To show the performance of the LSAL model, we qualitatively com-
pared the generated images by proposed model on CelebA dataset with other state of the art GANs
models. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the LSAL can produce details of face images as compared
to other methods. Faces have well defined borders and nose and eyes have real shape while in
LS-GAN 3.1(c) and DC-GAN 3.1(b) most of generated samples don’t have clear face borders and
samples of BEGAN model 3.1(d) lack stereoscopic features.
Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show the samples generated by LSAL for Cifar10, SVHN, and tiny Ima-
geNet datasets respectively.




Tiny ImageNet[107] 0.00004 0.018
Cifar10[69] 0.00004 0.02
30
Table 3.2: Comparison of Inception score for various GAN models on Cifar10 data-set. Inception
score of real data represents the upper bound of the score.
Model Inception score
Real data 11.24 ± 0.12
ALI[28] 4.98 ± 0.48
LS-GAN[100] 5.83 ± 0.22
LSAL 6.43 ± 0.53
Figure 3.3: Generated samples by LSAL on Cifar10 dataset with resolution of 32× 32.
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Figure 3.4: Generated samples by LSAL on SVHN dataset with resolution of 32× 32.
We also walk through the manifold space Z , projected by the pullback mapping Q. To this end,
pullback mapping network Q has been used to find the manifold representations z1 and z2 of two
randomly selected samples from the validation set. Then G has been used to generate new samples
for z’s on the linear interpolant of z1 and z2. As illustrated in Figure 3.6, the transition between
pairs of images are smooth and meaningful.
Quantitative comparison: To quantitively assess the quality of LSAL generated samples, we used
Inception Score proposed by [110]. We chose this metric as it had been widely used in literature so
we can fairly compare with the other models directly. We applied the Inception model to images
generated by various GAN models trained on Cifar10. The comparison of Inception scores on
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Figure 3.5: Generated samples by LSAL on Tiny ImageNet dataset with resolution of 64× 64.
50, 000 images generated by each model is reported in Table 3.2. Inception score of real data was
computed over the training set and it represents the upper bound that can be achieved on Cifar10.
3.5.3 Semi-supervised classification
Using semi-supervised LSAL to train an image classifier, we achieved competitive results in com-
parison to other GAN models. Table 3.4 shows the error rate of the semi-supervised LSAL along
with other semi-supervised GAN models when only 1, 000 labeled examples were used in train-
ing on SVHN with the other examples unlabeled. For Cifar10, LSAL was trained with various
numbers of labeled examples. In Table 3.3, we show the error rates of the LSAL with 1, 000,
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Figure 3.6: Generated images for the interpolation of latent representations learned by pullback
mapping Q for CelebA data-set. First and last column are real samples from validation set.
Table 3.3: Comparison of classification error on Cifar10





Improved GAN [110] 21.83± 2.01 19.61± 2.32 18.63± 2.32 17.72± 1.82
ALI[28] 19.98 ± 0.89 19.09± 0.44 17.99± 1.62 17.05± 1.49
LSAL 18.83± 0.44 17.97± 0.74 16.22± 0.31 14.17± 0.62
2, 000, 4, 000, and 8, 000 labeled images. The results show the proposed semi-supervised LSAL
successfully outperforms the other methods.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of classification error on SVHN test set for semi-supervised learning using
1000 labeled examples.
Model Classification error
Skip deep generative model[86] 16.61 ± 0.24
Improved GAN [110] 8.11 ± 1.3
ALI[28] 7.42 ± 0.65
CLS-GAN[100] 5.98 ± 0.27
LSAL 5.46± 0.24
3.5.4 Trends of Ambient and Manifold Margins
We also illustrate the trends of ambient and manifold margins as the learning algorithm proceeds
over epochs in Figure 3.7. The curves were obtained by training the LSAL model on Cifar10 with
4, 000 labeled examples, and both margins are averaged over mini-batches of real and fake pairs
sampled in each epoch.
From the illustrated curves, we can see that the manifold margin continues to decrease and even-
tually stabilize after about 270 epochs. As manifold margin decreases, we find the quality of
generated images continues to improve even though the ambient margin fluctuates over epochs.
This shows the importance of manifold margin that motivates the proposed LSAL model. It also
demonstrates the manifold margin between real and fake images should be a better indicator we
can use for the quality of generated images.
3.6 Summary
We present a novel regularized LSAL model, and justify it from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives. Based on the assumption that the real data are distributed on a low-dimensional
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Figure 3.7: Trends of manifold and ambient margins over epochs on the Cifar10 dataset. Example
images are generated at epoch 10, 100, 200, 300, 400.
manifold, we define a pullback operator that maps a sample back to the manifold. A manifold
margin is defined as the distance between the pullback representations to distinguish between real
and fake samples and learn the optimal generators. The resultant model also demonstrates it can
produce high quality images as compared with the other state-of-the-art GAN models.
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CHAPTER 4: CAPPRONET: DEEP FEATURE LEARNING VIA
ORTHOGONAL PROJECTIONS ONTO CAPSULE SUBSPACES
4.1 Introduction
Since the idea of capsule net [108][51] was proposed, many efforts [52][128][105][9] have been
made to seek better capsule architectures as the next generation of deep network structures. Among
them are the dynamic routing [108] that can dynamically connect the neurons between two consec-
utive layers based on their output capsule vectors. While these efforts have greatly revolutionized
the idea of building a new generation of deep networks, there are still a large room to improve the
state of the art for capsule nets.
In this section, we do not intend to introduce some brand new architectures for capsule nets. In-
stead, we focus on formalizing the principled idea of using the overall length of a capsule rather
than a single neuron activation to model the presence of an entity [108][51]. Unlike the existing
idea in literature [108][51], we formulate this idea by learning a group of capsule subspaces to
represent a set of entity classes. Once capsule subspaces are learned, we can obtain set of capsules
by performing an orthogonal projection of feature vectors onto these capsule subspaces.
Then, one can adopt the principle of separating the presence of an entity and its instantiation
parameters into capsule length and orientation, respectively. In particular, we use the lengths
of capsules to score the presence of entity classes corresponding to different subspaces, while
their orientations are used to instantiate the parameters of entity properties such as poses, scales,
deformations and textures. In this way, one can use the capsule length to achieve the intra-class
invariance in detecting the presence of an entity against appearance variations, as well as model the
equivalence of the instantiation parameters of entities by encoding them into capsule orientations
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[108].
Formally, each capsule subspace is spanned by a basis from the columns of a weight matrix in the
neural network. A capsule projection is performed by projecting input feature vectors fed from a
backbone network onto the capsule subspace. Specifically, an input feature vector is orthogonally
decomposed into the capsule component as the projection onto a capsule subspace and the com-
plement component perpendicular to the subspace. By analyzing the gradient through the capsule
projection, one can show that a capsule subspace is iteratively updated along the complement com-
ponent that contains the novel characteristics of the input feature vector. The training process will
continue until all presented feature vectors of an associated class are well contained by the corre-
sponding capsule subspace, or simply the back-propagated error accounting for misclassification
caused by capsule lengths vanishes.
We call the proposed deep network with the capsule projections the CapProNet for brevity. The
CapProNet is friendly to any existing network architecture – it is built upon the embedded features
generated by some neural networks and outputs the projected capsule vectors in the subspaces
according to different classes. This makes it amenable to be used together with existing network
architectures. We will conduct experiments on image datasets to demonstrate the CapProNet can
greatly improve the state-of-the-art results by sophisticated networks with only small negligible
computing overhead.
4.1.1 Our Findings
Briefly, we summarize our main findings from experiments upfront about the proposed CapProNet.
• The proposed CapProNet significantly advances the capsule net performance [108] by re-
ducing its test error from 10.3% and 4.3% on CIFAR10 and SVHN to 3.64% and 1.54%
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respectively upon the chosen backbones.
• The proposed CapProNet can also greatly reduce the error rate of various backbone networks
by adding capsule projection layers into these networks. For example, The error rate can be
reduced by more than 10− 20% based on Resnet backbone, and by more than 5− 6% based
on densenet backbone, with only < 1% and 0.04% computing and memory overhead in
training the model compared with the backbones.
• The orthogonal projection onto capsule subspaces plays a critical role in delivering compet-
itive performance. On the contrary, simply grouping neurons into capsules could not obvi-
ously improve the performance. This shows the capsule projection plays an indispensable
role in the CapProNet delivering competitive results.
• Our insight into the gradient of capsule projection explains the advantage of updating cap-
sule subspaces to continuously contain novel components of training examples until they
are correctly classified. We also find that the capsule projection can be viewed as a high-
dimensional extension of weight normalization, where the conventional weight normaliza-
tion is merely a simple case of the capsule projection onto 1D lines.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We present the idea of the Capsule Projection
Net (CapProNet) and discuss the implementation details This is followed by the experiment results
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the future work.
4.2 The Capsule Projection Nets
In this section, we begin by shortly revisiting the idea of conventional neural networks in classi-
fication tasks. Then we formally present the orthogonal projection of input feature vectors onto
multiple capsule subspaces where capsule lengths are separated from their orientations to score the
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presence of entities belonging to different classes. Finally, we analyze the gradient of the resul-
tant capsule projection by showing how capsule subspaces are updated iteratively to adopt novel
characteristics of input feature vectors through back-propagation.
4.2.1 Revisit: Conventional Neural Networks
Consider a feature vector x ∈ Rd generated by a deep network to represent an input entity. Given
its ground truth label y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, the output layer of the deep network aims to learn a group
of weight vectors {w1,w2, . . . ,wL} such that
wTy x > w
T
l x, for all, l 6= y. (4.1)
This hard constraint is usually relaxed to a differentiable softmax objective, and the backpropa-
gation algorithm is performed to train {w1,w2, . . . ,wL}and the backbone network generating the
input feature vector x.
4.2.2 Capsule Projection onto Subspaces
Unlike simply grouping neurons to form capsules for classification, we propose to learn a group
of capsule subspaces {S1,S2, . . . ,SL}, each associated with one of L classes. Suppose we have
a feature vector x ∈ Rd generated by a backbone network from an input sample. Then, to learn
a proper feature representation, we project x onto these capsule subspaces, yielding L capsules
{v1,v2, . . . ,vL} as projections. Then, we will use the lengths of these capsules to score the prob-
ability of the input sample belonging to different classes by assigning it to the one according to the
longest capsule.
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Formally, for each capsule subspace Sl of dimension c, we learn a weight matrix Wl ∈ Rd×c
the columns of which form the basis of the subspace, i.e., Sl = span(Wl) is spanned by the
column vectors. Then the orthogonal projection vl of a vector x onto Sl is found by solving
vl = arg minv∈span(Wl)‖x − v‖2. This orthogonal projection problem has the following closed-
form solution
vl = Plx, and Pl = WlW
+
l (4.2)
where Pl1 is called projection matrix for capsule subspace Sl, and W+l is the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse []. When the columns of Wl are independent, W+l becomes (WlWl)
−1Wl . In








where Σl = (WTl Wl)
−1 can be seen as a normalization matrix applied to the transformed feature
vector WTl x as a way to normalize the Wl-transformation based on the capsule projection. As we
will discuss in the next subsection, this normalization plays a critical role in updating Wl along
the orthogonal direction of the subspace so that novel components pertaining to the properties of
input entities can be gradually updated to the subspace.
In practice, since c  d, the c columns of Wl are usually independent in a high-dimensional d-D
space. Otherwise, one can always add a small εI to WTl Wl to avoid the numeric singularity when
taking the matrix inverse. Later on, we will discuss a fast iterative algorithm to compute the matrix
inverse with a hyper-power sequence that can be seamlessly integrated with the back-propagation
iterations.
1A projection matrix P for a subspace S is a symmetric idempotent matrix (i.e., PT = P and P2 = P) such that
its range space is S
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4.2.3 Insight into Gradients
In this section, we take a look at the gradient used to update Wl in each iteration, which can give
us some insight into how the CapProNet works in learning the capsule subspaces.
Suppose we minimize a loss function ` to train the capsule projection and the network. For sim-
plicity, we only consider a single sample x and its capsule vl. Then by the chain rule and the














where the operator (I − Pl) can be viewed as the projection onto the orthogonal complement of
the capsule subspace spanned by the columns of Wl,W+T denotes the transpose of W+,and the
factor ∂`
∂‖vl‖2
is the back-propagated error accounting for misclassification caused by ‖v‖2.
Denote by x⊥ , (I − Pl)x the projection of x onto the orthogonal component perpendicular to
the current capsule subspace Sl. Then, the above gradient ∂`∂Wl only contains the columns parallel
to x⊥ (up to coefficients in the vector xTW+T ). This shows that the basis of the current capsule
subspace Sl in the columns of Wl is updated along this orthogonal component of the input x to
the subspace.
One can regard x⊥ as representing the novel component of x not yet contained in the current Sl, it
shows capsule subspaces are updated to contain the novel component of each input feature vector
until all training feature vectors are well contained in these subspaces, or the back-propagated
errors vanish that account for misclassification caused by ‖vl‖2.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of 2-D capsule subspace S spanned by two basis vectors w1
and w2. An input feature vector x is decomposed into the capsule projection v onto S and an
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Figure 4.1: This figure illustrates a 2-D capsule subspace S spanned by two basis vectors w1
and w2. An input feature vector x is decomposed into the capsule projection v onto S and an
orthogonal complement x⊥ perpendicular to the subspace. In one training iteration, two basis




2 along the orthogonal direction x
⊥, where x⊥ is
viewed as containing novel characteristics of an entity not yet contained by S.
orthogonal complement x⊥ perpendicular to the subspace. In one training iteration, two basis




2 along the orthogonal direction x
⊥, where x⊥ is
viewed as containing novel characteristics of an entity not yet contained by S.
4.2.4 A Perspective of Multiple-Dimensional Weight Normalization
As discussed in the last subsection and Figure 4.1, we can explain the orthogonal components
represent the novel information in input data, and the orthogonal decomposition thus enables us to
update capsule subspaces by more effectively incorporating novel characteristics/components than
the classic capsule nets.
One can also view the capsule projection as normalizing the column basis of weight matrix Wl
simultaneously in a high-dimensional capsule space. If the capsule dimension c is set to 1, it is
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not hard to see that Eq. 4.3 can be rewritten by setting vl to
|WTl |x
‖W‖ . It produces the conventional
weight normalization of the vector Wl ∈ Rd, as a special 1D case of the capsule projection. As




l x, which keeps
‖vl‖ unchanged in Eq. 4.3. This enables us to extend the conventional weight normalization to
high dimesional capsule subspaces.
4.3 Implementation Details
We will discuss some implementation details in this section, including 1) the computing cost to
perform capsule projection and a fast iterative method by using hyper-power sequences without
restart; 2) the objective to train the capsule projection.
4.3.1 Computing Normalization Matrix
Taking a matrix inverse to get the normalization matrix Σl would be expensive with an increasing
dimension c. But after the model is trained, it is fixed in the inference with only one-time comput-
ing. Fortunately, the dimension c of a capsule subspace is usually much smaller than the feature
dimension d that is usually hundreds and even thousands. For example, c is typically no larger
than 8 in experiments. Thus, taking a matrix inverse to compute these normalization matrices only
incurs a small negligible computing overhead compared with the training of many other layers in
a deep network.
Alternatively, one can take advantage of an iterative algorithm to compute the normalization ma-
trix. We consider the following hyper-power sequence
Σl ← 2Σl −ΣlWTl WlΣl (4.5)
44
which has proven to converge to (WTW)−1 with a proper initial point [12][13]. In stochastic
gradient method, since only a small change is made to update Wl in each training iteration, thus
it is often sufficient to use this recursion to make an one-step update on the normalization matrix
from the last iteration. The normalization matrix Σl can be initialized to (WTl Wl)
−1 at the very
first iteration to give an ideal start. This could further save computing cost in training the network.
In experiments, a very small computing overhead was incurred in the capsule projection. For
example, training the ResNet110 on CIFAR10/100 costed about 0.16 seconds per iteration on a
batch of 128 images. In comparison, training the CapProNet with a ResNet110 backbone in an
end-to-end fashion only costed an additional < 0.001 seconds per iteration, that is less than 1%
computing overhead for the CapProNet compared with its backbone. For the inference, we did not
find any noticeable computing overhead for the CapProNet compared with its backbone network.
4.3.2 Training Capsule Projections
Given a group of capsule vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vL corresponding to a feature vector x and its ground
truth label y, we train the model by requiring
‖vy‖2 > ‖vl‖2, for all, l 6= y. (4.6)
In other words, we require ‖vy‖2 should be larger than all the length of the other capsules. As
a consequence, we can minimize the following negative logarithmic softmax function `(x, y) =
−log exp(‖vy‖2∑L
l=1 exp(‖vl‖2)
to train the capsule subspaces and the network generating x through back-
propagation in an end-to-end fashion. Once the model is trained, we will classify a test sample into
the class with the longest capsule.
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4.4 Discussion
The presented CapProNets are inspired by the CapsuleNets by adopting the idea of using a capsule
vector rather than a neural activation output to predict the presence of an entity and its properties
[108][51]. In particular, the overall length of a capsule vector is used to represent the existence of
the entity and its direction instantiates the properties of the entity. We formalize this idea by ex-
plicitly learning a group of capsule subspaces and project embedded features onto these subspaces.
The advantage of these capsule subspaces is their directions can represent characteristics of an en-
tity, which contains much richer information, such as its positions, orientations, scales and textures,
than a single activation output. By performing an orthogonal projection of an input feature vector
onto a capsule subspace, one can find the best direction revealing these properties. Otherwise, the
entity is thought of being absent as the projection vanishes when the input feature vector is nearly
perpendicular to the capsule subspace.
4.5 Experiments
We conduct experiments on benchmark datasets to evaluate the proposed CapProNet compared
with the other deep network models.
4.5.1 Datasets
We use both CIFAR and SVHN datasets in experiments to evaluate the performance.
CIFAR The CIFAR dataset contains 50, 000 and 10, 000 images of 32 × 32 pixels for the training
and test sets respectively. A standard data augmentation is adopted with horizonal flipping and
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shifting. The images are labeled with 10 and 100 categories, namely CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
datasets. A separate validation set of 5, 000 images are split from the training set to choose the
model hyperparameters, and the final test errors are reported with the chosen hyperparameters by
training the model on all 50, 000 training images.
SVHN The Street View House Number (SVHN) dataset has 73, 257 and 26, 032 images of colored
digits in the training and test sets, with an additional 531, 131 training images available. Following
the widely used evaluation protocol in literature [40][54][76][112], all the training examples are
used without data augmentation, while a separate validation set of 6, 000 images is split from the
training set. The model with the smallest validation error is selected and the error rate is reported.
ImageNet The ImageNet data-set consists of 1.2 million training and 50k validation images. We
apply mean image subtraction as the only pre-processing step on images and use random cropping,
scaling and horizontal flipping for data augmentation [6]. The final resolution of both train and
validation sets is 224 × 224, and 20k images are chosen randomly from training set for tuning
hyper parameters.
4.5.2 Backbone Networks
We test various networks such as ResNet [47], ResNet (pre-activation)[48], WideResNet[139] and
Densenet[53] as the backbones in experiments. The last output layer of a backbone network is
replaced by the capsule projection, where the feature vector from the second last layer of the
backbone is projected onto multiple capsule subspaces.
The CapProNet is trained from the scratch in an end-to-end fashion on the given training set.
For the sake of fair comparison, the strategies used to train the respective backbones [47] [48]
[139], such as the learning rate schedule, parameter initialization, and the stochastic optimization
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Table 4.1: Error rates on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN. The best results are highlighted in bold
for the methods with the same network architectures. Not all results on different combinations of
network backbones or datasets have been reported in literature, and missing results are remarked
”-” in the table.
Method Depth Params CIFAR10 CIFAR100 SVHN
ResNet[47] 110 1.7M 6.61 - -
ResNet(reported by[54]) 110 1.7M 6.41 - -
CapProNet+Resnet(c=2) 110 1.7M 6.41 27.22 2,01
CapProNet+Resnet(c=4) 110 1.7M 5.27 22.45 1.82
CapProNet+Resnet(c=8) 110 1.7M 5.19 21.93 1.79
ResNet(pre-activation)[48] 164 1.7M 5.46 24.33 -
CapProNet+ResNet(pre-activation c=4) 164 1.7M 4.88 21.37 -
CapProNet+ResNet(pre-activation c=8) 164 1.7M 4.89 20.91 -
WideResNet[139] 16 11.0M 4.81 22.07 -
28 36.5M 4.17 20.50 -
with Dropout 16 2.7M - - 1.64
CapProNet+WideResNet (c=4) 16 11.0M 4.20 21.33 -
28 36.5M 3.64 19.98 -
with Dropout 16 2.7M - - 1.58
CapProNet+WideResNet (c=8) 16 11.0M 4.04 20.12 -
28 36.5M 3.85 19.83 -
with Dropout 16 2.7M - - 1.54
Densenet-BC k=12 [53] 100 0.8M 4.51 22.27 1.76
CapProNet Densenet-BC k=12(c=4) 100 0.8M 4.35 21.22 1.64
CapProNet Densenet-BC k=12 (c=8) 100 0.8M 4.25 21.19 1.64
solver, are adopted to train the CapProNet. We will denote the CapProNet with a backbone X by
CapProNet+X below.
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Table 4.2: The CapProNet results with Resnet50 and Resnet101 backbones for Single crop top-
1/top-5 error rate on ImageNet validation set with image resolution of 224 × 224, as well as the
comparison with original baseline results.
Method Reported result[47] our rerun CapProNet(c=2) CapProNet(c=4) CapProNet(c=8)
ResNet50 24.8/7.8 24.09/7.13 23.282/6.81 23.265/6.648 23.203/6.78
ResNet101 23.6/7.1 22.81/6.67 22.192/6.178 21.89/6 21.9/6.01
Table 4.3: Comparison between GroupNeuron and CapProNet with the ResNet110 backbone on
CIFAR10 dataset. The best results are highlighted in bold for c = 2, 4, 8 capsules. It shows the






We perform experiments with various networks as backbones for comparison with the proposed
CapProNet. In particular, we consider three variants of ResNets – the classic one reported in
[54] with 110 layers, the ResNet with pre-activation [48] with 164 layers, and two paradigms of
WideResNets [139] with 16 and 28 layers, as well as densenet-BC [53] with 100 layers. Compared
with ResNet and ResNet with pre-activation, WideResNet has fewer but wider layers that reaches
smaller error rates as shown in Table 4.1. We test the CapProNet+X with these different backbone
networks to evaluate if it can consistently improve these state-of-the-art backbones. It is clear
from Table 4.1 that the CapProNet+X outperforms the corresponding backbone networks by a
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remarkable margin. For example, the CapProNet+ResNet reduces the error rate by 19%, 17.5%
and 10% on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN, while CapProNet+Densenet reduces the error rate
by 5.8%, 4.8% and 6.8% respectively. Finally, we note that the CapProNet significantly advances
the capsule net performance [108] by reducing its test error from 10.3% and 4.3% on CIFAR10
and SVHN to 3.64% and 1.54% respectively based on the chosen backbones.
We also evaluate the CapProNet with Resnet50 and Resnet101 backbones for single crop Top-
1/Top-5 results on ImageNet validation set. To ensure fair comparison, we retrain the backbone
networks based on the offical Resnet model2, where both original Resnet[47] and CapProNet are
trained with the same training strategies on four GPUs. The results are reported in Table 4.2, where
CapProNet+X successfully outperforms the original backbones on both Top-1 and Top-5 error
rates. It is worth noting the gains are only obtained with the last layer of backbones replaced by the
capsule project layer. We believe the error rate can be further reduced by replacing the intermediate
convolutional layers with the capsule projections, and we leave it to our future research.
We also note that the CapProNet+X consistently outperforms the backbone counterparts with vary-
ing dimensions c of capsule subspaces. In particular, with the WideResNet backbones, in most
cases, the error rates are reduced with an increasing capsule dimension c on all datasets, where the
smallest error rates often occur at c = 8. In contrast, while CapProNet+X still clearly outperforms
both ResNet and ResNet (pre-activation) backbones, the error rates are roughly at the same level.
This is probably because both ResNet backbones have a much smaller input dimension d = 64 of
feature vectors into the capsule projection than that of WideResNet backbone where d = 128 and
d = 160 with 16 and 28 layers, respectively. This turns out to suggest that a larger input dimension
can enable to use capsule subspaces of higher dimensions to encode patterns of variations along
more directions in a higher dimensional input feature space.
2https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/official/resnet
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To further assess the effect of capsule projection, we compare with the method that simply groups
the output neurons into capsules without performing orthogonal projection onto capsule subspaces.
We still use the lengths of these resultant ”capsules” of grouped neurons to classify input im-
ages and the model is trained in an end-to-end fashion accordingly. Unfortunately, this approach,
namely GroupNeuron+ResNet in Table 4.3, does not show significant improvement over the back-
bone network. For example, the smallest error rate by GroupNeuron+ResNet is 6.26 at c = 2,
a small improvement over the error rate of 6.41 reached by ResNet110. This demonstrates the
capsule projection makes an indispensable contribution to improving model performances.
When training on CIFAR10/100 and SVHN, one iteration typically costs ∼ 0.16 seconds for
Resnet-110, with an additional less than 0.01 second to train the corresponding CapProNet. That
is less than 1% computing overhead. The memory overhead for the model parameters is even
smaller. For example, the CapProNet+ResNet only has an additional 640 - 6400 parameters at
c = 2 compared with 1.7M parameters in the backbone ResNet. We do not notice any large com-
puting or memory overheads with the ResNet (pre-activation) or WideResNet, either. This shows
the advantage of CapProNet+X as its error rate reduction is not achieved by consuming much
more computing and memory resources.
4.5.4 Visualization of Projections onto Capsule Subspaces
To give an intuitive insight into the learned capsule subspaces, we plot the projection of input
feature vectors onto capsule subspaces. Instead of directly using Plx to project feature vectors
onto capsule subspaces in the original input space Rd, we use (WTW)− 12 WTxto project an input
feature vector x onto Rc, since this projection preserves the capsule length ‖vl‖2 defined in Eq.4.3.
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Figure 4.2: These figures plot the 2-D capsule subspaces and projected capsules corresponding to
ten classes on CIFAR10 dataset. In each figure, red capsules represent samples from the class cor-
responding to the subspace, while green capsules belong to a different class. It shows red samples
have larger capsule length (relative to the origin) than those of green samples. This validates the
capsule length as the classification criterion in the proposed model. Note that some figures have
different scales in two axes for a better illustration.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a novel capsule project network by learning a group of capsule subspaces
for different classes. Specifically, the parameters of an orthogonal projection is learned for each
class and the lengths of projected capsules are used to predict the entity class for a given input
feature vector. The training continues until the capsule subspaces contain input feature vectors
of corresponding classes or the back-propagated error vanishes. Experiment results on real image
datasets show that the proposed CapProNet+X could greatly improve the performance of backbone
network without incurring large computing and memory overheads. While we only test the capsule
projection as the output layer in this chapter, we will attempt to insert it into intermediate layers of
backbone networks as well, and hope this could give rise to a new generation of capsule networks
with more discriminative architectures in future.
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CHAPTER 5: SUBSPACE CAPSULE NETWORKS
5.1 Introduction
In the recent years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have become a key asset to most of
fields in AI. Various tasks in computer vision, reinforcement learning, natural language and speech
processing systems have achieved significant improvement by using them. From primitive tasks
like key-point detection and matching [85] and [84] to new applications like music generation [26],
visual text correction and visual question answering[88, 122], online fashion recommendation [45],
all are founded on the feature learning capability of CNN architectures.
Despite their successful performance, CNNs suffer from a major drawback. They fail to capture
the hierarchy of spatial relation among different parts of an entity. As a remedy to this problem,
Hinton et al. introduced the idea of Capsule Networks [51]. Capsule networks received a flurry
of attention after achieving the state-of-the-art performance on image classification [108], text
classification [146], action detection and localization [27], image segmentation tasks [73], etc.
Moreover, many efforts have been made to improve the structure of capsule networks [52] [9][142]
as a new generation of deep neural networks.
A capsule is defined as a group of neurons that can ultimately model different properties such as
pose, texture or deformation of an entity or a part of an entity. Each layer of a capsule network
consists of many capsules. In a well-trained capsule network, activation vector of each capsule
represents the instantiation parameters of the entity and the length of the capsule scores the pres-
ence of that feature or part of that entity Here, while we still follow the main definition of capsules,
we propose Subspace Capsule Networks (SCNs), which build capsules based on the degree of
relevance of an input feature vector to a group of learned subspaces. In SCNs, corresponding to
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each entity or part of that entity, a specific capsule subspace is learned. Then a capsule is created
by projecting the input feature vector onto the capsule subspace using a learned transformation,
defined based on the basis of the corresponding capsule subspace. Intuitively speaking, a capsule
subspace captures the variation in visual properties; like appearance, pose, texture and deforma-
tion; of an object or an implicitly defined feature of that object. The length of the output vector
of a subspace capsule represents the degree of alignment of an input with the properties modeled
by that subspace. Hence, if a subspace capsule has a large activity vector, it means that the input
feature vector is highly related to the entity modeled by that subspace and vice versa. This form
of creating subspace capsules makes it independent of any form of routing required in capsule
network introduced in [108] or [52]. Due to this property, SCN is easily scalable to large network
architectures and large datasets.
In SCN, unlike CapProNet we are interested in both subspace capsules and norm of capsules.
The summary of our contributions is as follows:
• The proposed SCN is a general capsule model that can be used without any
change in the formulation in both generative models as well as discriminative
models.
• SCN is computationally efficient with no computational overhead during test
phase and a negligible computational overhead with help of the method intro-
duced in Section (5.4) during training, compared to the baselines.
• When applied in generator model of a GAN, SCN consistently improves the rel-
ative FID score of generated samples by at least 20% in all of our experiments.
• SCN achieves state-of-the-art performance in semi-supervised classification of
CIFAR10 and SVH datasets and improves the relative error rate of the baseline
models by at least 23% for these 2 datasets.
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Figure 5.1: MNIST samples are generated by varying each dimension of capsules of first layer by a value
in the range of [−2.5, 2.5]
• SCN is easily scalable to large architectures and datasets like ImageNet. When
applies on the last block of the Resnet model, it decreases the Top-1 error rate by
5% relatively.
5.2 Subspace Capsule Networks
In this section, we formalize the idea of subspace capsule networks (SCNs) by presenting their
main components. In each layer, a SCN learns a group of capsule subspaces, each of which captures
possible variations of an implicitly defined visual entity. An input from the lower layer is projected
onto each of these capsule subspaces to create new capsules. If the input and a capsule subspace
are related; for instance, the input is a part of the entity represented by a capsule subspace; the
output vector (projection of the input vector on to the the corresponding subspace) will be large.
Moreover, the orientation of a capsule vector represents the properties of that entity.
Since the key component of a SCN is finding the level of alignment of input feature vectors and
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capsule subspaces, we elaborate on the proposed projection matrix and formulate subspace cap-
sules. Then, capsule activation functions are presented followed by subspace capsule convolution
layer and the idea of subspace capsule mean pooling.
5.2.1 Projection onto a Capsule Subspace
For the layer k, suppose x ∈ Rd is an input feature vector from a lower layer k − 1. Suppose a
capsule subspace S with dimensions c is formed as the span of the columns of the weight matrix
W ∈ Rd×c, where c d.
The most straight-forward way to find the degree of alignment of feature vector x and capsule
subspace S is to orthogonally project x onto subspace S. This problem has a closed-form solution
as follows
y = W (W TW )−1W T︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
x, (5.1)
where P ∈ Rd×d is the matrix of orthogonal projection onto S, and y ∈ Rd is the projection of
x onto S. The larger the length of y, the more correlated x and capsule subspace S are. In other
words, x has more of the properties modeled by S.
However, the projection matrix P ∈ Rd×d has the major drawback of being a square matrix.
This means that if we create a capsule by projecting the feature vector x ∈ Rd onto capsule
subspace S using P , that capsule is still in the d-dimensional space. Practically speaking, if
d is large, which is usually the case in deep models, having different capsule types using the
orthogonal projection matrix P would be impossible since it demands a lots of memory. To be
able to benefit from various sizes of capsules through the sequence of subspace capsule layers, one
needs a transformation that allows the input feature vector x to be mapped onto the c-dimensional
space of capsule subspace, while it still preserves the relation among the capsules in the consecutive
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layers of network. We propose to employ an intermediate domain indicated by a transformation
matrix P c ∈ Rc×d in order to exploit capsule subspaces. This matrix is derived by decomposing
the orthogonal projection matrix P as
P = P d P c, (5.2)
where
P d = W (W
TW )−1/2, (5.3a)
P c = (W
TW )−1/2W T . (5.3b)
Here P c is the transformation that maps the input feature vector x into the c-dimensional capsule
space1, and P d is the transformation that projects vectors in the capsule space back to the original
d-dimensional space of input feature vector x. Now, the capsule that corresponds to the capsule
subspace S can be created by projecting feature vector x onto the c-dimensional capsule space as
u = P c x. (5.4)
Here, u indicates the low-dimensional representation of x in the capsule space. Matrix P is a
semi-definite and symmetric matrix. Thus its decomposition as suggested in Equation (5.2) has
special properties. We claim that a capsule created using P c has the same information about
the instantiation parameters and also the score of presence of features, as it would be created by
transformation P . Proof of this claim follows from the Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let P , as defined in (5.1), denote an orthogonal projection matrix onto the subspace
spanned by columns of the weight matrix W ∈ Rd×c. Assume P is decomposed into two matrices
1This c-dim space is defined by the span of right singular vectors of W .
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P d and P c as in (5.2). Then, the transformation matrix P d is an isomorphic transformation
between Rc and Rd, i.e., ∀u ∈ Rc, ‖u‖2 = ‖P du‖2.
The following can be concluded from Theorem 2.
• The norm of the capsule vector u defined in Equation (5.4) represents the score of features
modeled by S in the input feature vector x, since ‖u‖ = ‖y‖, where ||.|| denotes that l2-
norm of a vector.
• For two input feature vectors x1 and x2, the relation between their corresponding capsules
u1 and u2 is the same as the relation between y1 and y2. For instance the angle between u1
and u2 is the same as the angle between y1 and y2.
5.2.2 Activation Function
We apply two types of activation functions on subspace capsule based on our interpretation of
the length of the output vector of a capsule. The length of the output vector of a capsule can be
interpreted from the confidence perspective. A high confidence for a capsule shows that the input
feature vector is highly aligned with the capsule subspace. In other words, the input feature vector
contains the entity that is modeled by capsule subspace. We also want to suppress the effect of
noisy capsules of layer L on activating the capsules of the next layer. Following this perspective
we propose “sparking” function given by
v = max(‖u‖ − b2, 0) u
‖u‖
, (5.5)




Figure 5.2: a) In the generator, the latent representation z is projected onto 10 capsule sbspaces with
dimension c = 16 in the first layer. The capsule with largest vector is selected and reshaped to a cube of
25 × 2 × 2, then up-sampled to double the spatial resolution to 4 × 4. This cube goes through 2 layers of
sc-conv with 8 capsule types of 16 and 8 capsule dimensions, respectively, each followed by upsampling
operation to get to the resolution of 16× 16. The final sc-conv layer has 8 subspace capsule types each with
8 dimension. The output of this layer is fed to a transposed convolution layer to generate the final image.
b) The SCN architecture of discriminator component of GAN for SVHN dataset. Features are extracted
using 6 convolutional layers, followed by 3 subspace capsule convolution (SC-conv) layers each with 64
subspace capsule types, one subspace capsule mean pool(SC-mean pool) layer and final subspace capsule
fully connected (SC-Fc) layer with 10 capsule types.
Intuitively, the proposed activation function tries to increase the capsule certainty, if x is related
to the entity modeled by capsule subspace S, or completely turn the capsule off if the length of
it is below the threshold b2. We initialize b2 = 0.25 in our experiments and update it along with
network parameters through the training process using stochastic gradient decent method.
Another possibility is to relate the probability of the presence of an entity modeled by a capsule
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We found sparking function is more effective in discriminative tasks, i.e., in our (semi-)supervised
classification of images; since it outputs sparse feature maps by turning off noisy capsules which
leads to faster convergence. Noisy capsules in each layer are those capsules represent the properties
that are not related to the input image and would have a small activity vector. While in generative
models, having small but non-zero values by applying squashing activation function on capsules
leads to the higher quality of generated samples.
5.2.3 Subspace Capsule Convolution
SCN can also benefit from the idea of weight sharing of CNNs by using the same subspace capsule
types in all spatial locations of an image.
In subspace capsule convolution, if the input x has i feature maps, and we want to create a c
dimensional subspace capsule convolution kernel with receptive field of k, we need to build the
transformation matrix P c as defined in Equation (5.3b), based on a weight matrix W ∈ R(i×k×k)×c.
We can treat each row of the projection matrix P c as one convolution kernel of size (i × k × k),
that convolves over input feature maps and generates a single element of output capsule. So if P c
gets reorganized into a 4-dimensional tensor with the shape of (c× i× k × k), then it can be used
as the kernel of regular convolution operation and the capsule corresponds to each spatial location
would be placed along the output feature maps. Now, if we want to have n subspace capsule types,
we can create a group of projection matrices {P c1 , ...,P cn}, after reorganizing each of them to a
4-dimensional tensor, and then concatenate them to create a kernel of shape (nc× i×k×k). From
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now on, we represent the kernel of a Subspace capsule convolution layer with a tuple of (n, c, k, k).
5.2.4 Subspace Capsule Mean Pooling
The idea of mean pooling comes naturally after subspace capsule convolutions. In subspace cap-
sule convolution, capsules of the same type represent the same visual property regardless of spatial
positions. So it is a safe assumption that capsules of the same type in a small receptive field of k×k
have similar orientation and a single capsule with mean of those capsule vectors can represent all
of them.
5.2.5 Gradient Analysis
Subspace capsule networks are trained based on the stochastic gradient descent methods. So an-
alyzing the gradient that is used to update W in each step clarifies how SCN learns capsule sub-
spaces.
Assume we have a loss function L and we want to differentiate it with respect to the weight matrix
W , the basis of subspace S, through the projection onto subspace (Equation 5.3b). For the sake of
simplicity we first assume a 1−dimensional capsule subspace, i.e, c = 1. Using the chain rule the




(I − P )∇PcL, (5.7)
where ∇PcL is the gradient with respect to the projection matrix P c and it is computed the same
way as the gradient with respect to the kernel of a convolution operation. The term (I − P ) is
the projection matrix onto the orthogonal complement of subspace S. This shows that the basis of
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capsule subspace S spanned by the columns of W only updated along the orthogonal complement
of S up to the scale 1‖W ‖ . The orthogonal complement of S can contain those novel features from
x that are not yet captured by S.
This nice property of gradient can extend to higher dimensional subspaces. Using the chain rule
and derivative of inverse of a matrix (Petersen et al. ) the gradient is as follows:
∇W ijL = (W TW )−
1
2sTij(I − P )∇PcL, (5.8)
where sij is a single non-zero entry matrix corresponding to the gradient of W with respect to one
of its elements in position (i, j). The general case also supports our conclusion from the special
case since (W TW )
−1
2 only stretch the space along the basis of subspace by the scale factor of
eigenvalues of (W TW )−
1
2 .
5.3 SubSpace Capsule Networks for GANs
So far we have defined all the building blocks of a subspace capsule network. Next, we want to
discuss how SCN can be effective in enhancing the performance of GANs. When GAN models
are used in semi-supervised learning tasks, like image classification, the discriminator can benefit
from SCN ability by modeling the possible variations of visual properties; for instance texture,
pose, color corresponding to an entity using a group of capsule subspaces through a sequence of
subspace capsule layers. By creating the capsule using projection of input feature vector onto
these capsule subspaces, and considering the length of capsules as confidence about the presence
of those properties that are modeled by subspaces, the discriminator can be made invariant with
respect to the possible deformations of each visual property.
GAN models can also leverage the ability of subspace capsule layer in the generator network. A
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subspace capsule generator consists of multiple subspace capsule layers and each layer has multiple
subspace capsule types. When trained, each subspace capsule type models all the possible variation
of a visual entity. Now the goal of the generator in each layer is to find the related properties and
features that need to be added to the generated image so far. In addition using SCN as generator
leads to more diverse generated samples since in each layer, properties are sampled from subspaces
that ensure the disentanglement of variation along their basis. In other word, each dimension of a
subspace capsule has unique effect on the generated samples. Figure (5.1) showcases this property
of SCN. Each row represents one feature like rotation, thickness of stroke, scale of generated digits
and samples are generated by tweaking one dimension of capsules of the first layer of generator
in the range of [−2.5, 2.5]. The generated samples in each row are diverse, and we can move over
the appearance manifold of each digit by changing the value of capsule dimension.Figure 5.2(a)
shows the architecture of SCN generator with detailed training process explained in Section 5.5.
5.4 Projection Matrix Implementation
The projection matrix P c as defined in Equation (5.3b) involves taking the inverse of the square
root of matrix W TW , two very computationally expensive operations. If not being properly
implemented, these operations can hinder the training process. In this work, we use an stable
extension of Denman-Beavers iterative method [24]. It is known that for any symmetric posi-
tive (semi-)definite matrix A, there exists a unique symmetric positive (semi-)definite square root
matrix. Higham et al. proposed in [49] an iterative process that converges to the square root of
such matrices. This iterative process is presented below: Initialize Y0 = A and Z0 = I . For
















tively. This process only requires matrix multiplication, which fits the best for parallel computation
on GPUs. Further, it computes the inverse of square root of matrix W TW simultaneously. In all
of our experiments we set the number of iterations as k = 20. This iterative process increases the
training time negligibly compared to the total training time.
It is worth noting that when training process completes, the capsule projection matrix P c is fixed
and there is no time overhead for this iterative process.
5.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we demonstrate the superiority of SCNs on three tasks2: Supervised classification
of image data, semi-supervised classification of image data and generating high-quality images on
multiple datasets. Datasets: We use CIFAR10 [69], Street View House Number (SVHN) [94],
ImageNet [23], CelebA [83], and 3 categories of Lsun dataset, namely bedroom, cat and horse,
throughout our experiments.
5.5.1 SCNs for Classification
Semi-supervised classification: For semi-supervised classification, we evaluate the performance
of the SCN model on two benchmark datasets of CIFAR10 and SVHN through the GAN frame-
work. To have a fair comparison with the state-of-the-art methods, we use the same network
architecture and loss functions for generator and discriminator as the model proposed by [111]
SVHN: In semi-supervised classification of the SVHN dataset, we replace the last 4 layers of the
2Code:http://github.com/MarziEd/SubSpace-Capsule-Network
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Table 5.1: Classification errors on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets compared with the state-of-the-art meth-
ods. The error rates with Nl = 4000 and Nl = 1000 labeled training examples are reported.
Methods
CIFAR10 SVHN
Nl= 4000 Nl =1000
Improved GAN 18.63 ± 2.32 8.11 ± 1.3
ALI 17.99 ± 1.69 7.42 ± 0.65
LSAL 16.22 ± 0.31 5.46± 0.24
VAT 14.87 ± 0.13 6.83± 0.24
SCN 14.32± 0.21 4.58± 0.18
discriminator with subspace capsule layers. Figure 5.2(b) shows the architecture of SCN discrim-
inator. An input image passes through 6 convolutional layers that produce 128 feature maps of
size 8 × 8. These feature maps go through three subspace capsule convolution layers, each layer
has 64 different capsule types of 2-dimensional subspace. The first subspace capsule convolution
layer has the kernel size of 3× 3 and the last two have kernel size of 1× 1. We apply the sparking
function on all three layers. We feed the capsules of the last subspace capsule convolution layer
to a subspace capsule mean pooling layer, with receptive field of 6 × 6, that results in 64 capsule
types of size 2, followed by the final subspace capsule fully connected layer with 10, 4-dimensional
subspace capsule types. The input image belongs to the class with the largest norm of the output
capsule.
CIFAR10: For the CIFAR10 dataset, the architecture of discriminator is similar to that of SVHN,
except the subspace capsule convolution layers have 96 capsule types of size 2. The generator
architecture for both datasets are the same as baseline architecture [111].
We train the network using Adam optimizer with initial learning rate of 0.0003 with β1 = 0.5 and
β2 = 0.99. We hold out a set of 5000 training samples as our validation set for subspace capsule
dimension selection, and fine tune the whole model on all training samples afterward.
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Table 5.2: Single crop, Top1 and Top 5 error rate of ImageNet classification with Resnet backbone model.
In SC-Fc and SC-Conv columns, in a tuple (n, c) , n is the number of capsule types and c is the subspace
capsule dimension.
Model Depth SC-Fc SC-Conv Top1 Top5
Resent 34 - - 27.13 8.84
SCN 34 (1000,4) (256,2) 25.64 8.17
SCN 34 (1000,4) (128,4) 25.96 8.35
Table 5.1 compares the performance of SCN model on semi-supervised image classification of
CIFAR10 and SVHN for 4000 and 1000 labeled samples, respectively.
Supervised classification: We evaluate the scalability of SCN on large datasets like ImageNet.
We also compare the performance of SCN with capsule network proposed by Sabour et al. . on
CIFAR10 dataset.
ImageNet: For ImageNet dataset, the last 4 layers of the Resnet model with depth of 34 have been
replaced with SCN layers, batch normalization layers in the final block and also the final residual
connection are removed. Mean pooling is replaced by the SCN mean pooling. The model was
trained using SGD with momentum rate of 0.9 for 100 epochs. The learning rate is initialized as
0.1 and decayed every 30 epochs with the rate of 0.1. Table 5.2 shows that SCN outperforms the
baseline model and reduces the relative top-1 classification error of Resnet by 5%.
CIFAR10: For supervised classification of CIFAR10, we also update the convolution layers of the
last bottleneck block of Resnet model with 110 layers to SCN convolution layers. Each of them has
32 capsule types with subspace capsule dimension c = 2. Batch normalization layers and residual
connection of this block has been removed. Mean pooling is replaced by SCN mean pooling and
the final fully connected layer is replaced by SCN fully connected layer with 10 capsule types






Figure 5.3: Generated samples for various datasets. (a) CelebA (128× 128), (b) Bedroom (128×
128), (c) Horse (256× 256). (d) Cat (256× 256).
outperforms capsule network model [108] with 10.6% error rate. It also improved the relative error
rate of the Resent model by 19.6% by reducing it from 6.41% to 5.15%
67
Table 5.3: Comparison of FID score of SCN with our baseline model. Entries with ∗ are our rerun
of the baseline.
Method CelebA Bedroom Horse Cat
ProgGAN[64] 9.67∗ 21.1∗ 16.11 37.52
SCN 6.23 9.94 12.83 29.20
5.5.2 SCNs for Image Generation
We evaluate the effectiveness of subspace capsule networks on the image generation task using the
GAN framework for various size of images and datasets. In all of our experiments, we build the
generator based on subspace capsule networks and the discriminator based on CNNs.
MNIST: The SCN architecture of generator is shown in Figure 5.2(a). The first layer has 10
subspace capsule types. Each of them is a 16−dimesional capsule subspace. The output of the
first layer is 10 subspace capsules. The capsule with the largest output vector is selected and
reshaped to a (2 × 2 × 25) tensor. This tensor goes through a bilinearly upsampling layer to
double the spatial size and a subspace capsule convolution layer with kernel size of (8, 16, 3, 3).
The third layer has the same structure of upsampleing and subspace capsule convolution layer
as the second layer except that it has the kernel size of (8, 8, 3, 3). This is followed by the last
subspace capsule convolution layer with kernel size of (8, 8, 3, 3). The final layer is a transposed
convolution layer with the receptive field of (5×5) with stride of 2 followed by sigmoid activation
function. All subspace capsule convolution layers have stride 1 and squashing activation function.
The discriminator architecture is composed of 4 convolution layers with receptive field of (5× 5)
and stride of 2. We apply batch normalization to all convolutional layers and the activation function
is leaky Relu with slope of 0.2. This is followed by a global mean pooling and a fully connected
layer to 10 output classes.
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We follow AC-GAN [95], and add an auxiliary classification loss to ensure that each capsule
subspace in the first layer of generator captures the variation of a single class. To this end, we use
the index of the capsule with the maximum length in the first layer as the ground truth label for the
generated sample. We train this model using Adam optimizer with initial learning rate of 0.0002
for 25 epochs.
High-Resolution Images: We also apply SCN for generating high-resolution images of size 1282
and 2562 for CelebA and 3 classes of LSUN datasets. To have a fair comparison with the state-of-
the-art models, we build SCN generative model based on the model proposed by [64]. Karras et
al. suggest to use progressive growing of generator and discriminator models for generating high
resolution images. The training starts from a low resolution of 4× 4 and gradually a new block for
higher resolution is added to the both generator and discriminator models. This process continues
until the networks get to the final resolution of images. Each block in this model consists of an
up-sampling step and a convolutionl layer.
For CelebA and LSUN bedroom datasets we generate samples with resolution of 1282. In the
generator model, we update all the convolutional layers from resolution 4 to resolution 64 to SCN
convolution, and Relu activation function is replaced by squashing activation function. The higher
resolution blocks of 64 and 128 are remained intact. For LSUN cat and LSUN horse datasets,
we generate samples of size 2562. In the generator network, we replace all convolutional layers
for all resolutions with SCN convolution layers followed by squashing activation function. Table
5.4 presents the configuration of subspace convolutional layers for all experiments. We use the
tuple notation of (n, c, k, k) to denote a subspace capsule convolution layer with n capsule types,
c-dimensional capsule subspaces and a receptive field of k × k.
To stabilize training process we adopt Wasserestien loss with gradient penalty. We also benefit
from progressive growing through training process. For all of the experiments, the discriminator
69
Table 5.4: Configuration of subspace capsule convolution layers for the generator networks. “LR”
and “FR” stand for the layer resolution and final image resolution respectively.
LR
CelebA, bedroom cat, horse
FR=128 FR=256
4 (4, 128, 3, 3) (8, 64, 3, 3)
8 (4, 128, 3, 3) (8, 64, 3, 3)
16 (4, 64, 3, 3) (8, 64, 3, 3)
32 (2, 64, 3, 3) (8, 64, 3, 3)
64 - (8, 32, 3, 3)
128 - (4, 32, 3, 3)
256 - (2, 32, 3, 3)
Figure 5.4: In each row, the first and last samples in the red boxes are generated using two
independent noise vectors. The intermediate samples are generated by walking through the linear
interpolant of those two noise vectors.
network is the same as the baseline architecture. We compare the generated samples quantitatively
with the state-of-the-art model using Fréchet Inception Distance (FID). We believe the FID metric
is the closest one to the human judgment, since it compares the statistic of features extracted; using
Inception model; from generated samples with real samples. Comparison of numerical values of
this metric for all datasets are presented in Table 5.3. In all 4 datasets, SCN consistently improved
the relative FID score of generated samples by at least 20%. Figure 5.3 shows generated samples
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for these datasets.
Interpolation of Latent Representation: To verify that SCN generator does not merely memorize
training samples, we also walk through the manifold space. To this end we choose two random
latent representation z1 and z2, then we use SCN generator to generate samples for z s on the linear
interpolant of z1 and z2. Figure (5.4) shows the interpolated samples for LSUN-horse and LSUN-
cat datasets. As it can be seen the transition between pairs of latent representations are smooth and
meaningful.
5.5.3 Ablation Study
In this section we analyze the effect of subspace capsule size and also position in the network on
performance. Table 5.5 reports the semi-supervised classification error rate of SVHN dataset with
1000 labeled training samples, when we update the last fully-connected or convolution layers with
various size capsules. Configuration 0 demonstrates the result of the baseline model [111], the
first three rows after that correspond to the settings when subspace capsules are only applied on
the last layer with various capsule sizes of 2,4 and 8. The configurations [4-6] correspond to the
settings when the last 3 convolution layers are replaced in the discriminator with subspace capsule
convolution layers. We conclude the following results from this analysis. 1- Subspace capsule
layers are effective in improving the overall performance even if we use them only in one layer of
the discriminator network. 2- The proper combination of capsule types and the capsule dimension
plays a key role in achieving the best performance.
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Table 5.5: Error rate of semi-supervised classification for SVHN dataset for 1000 labeled sam-
ples for various size and type of subspace capsule and. SC-Fc stands for subspace capsule fully
connected layer. In a tuple (n,c), n is the number of capsule types and c is the subspace capsule
dimension.
config SC-Fc SC-Conv Error rate
0 [111] - - 8.11
1 (10,2) - 5.8
2 (10,4) - 5.12
3 (10,8) - 5.2
4 - (64,2) 5.26
5 - (32,4) 5.49
6 - (16,8) 5.37
7 (10,4) (64,2) 4.58
5.6 Summary
We proposed SubSpace Capsule Networks, referred to as SCNs, which offer a general capsule
model with no computational overhead compared to CNNs. SCN learns a group of capsule sub-
spaces to model the variations in the properties of an entity through the sequence of layers. We suc-
cessfully applied SCN on the GAN framework, both on generator and discriminator networks lead-
ing to the state-of-the-art performance in semi-supervised classification on CIFAR10 and SVHN
and significantly improving the quality of generated samples.
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CHAPTER 6: ODYSSEY: CREATION, ANALYSIS AND DETECTION OF
TROJAN MODELS
In this chapter, we analysis the reliability and fidelity of deep learning models based on their
behaviour and properties around manifold of data.
6.1 Introduction
Neural networks (NNs) have become the primary choice for tasks like image recognition [71, 119,
35], speech recognition [90, 50], defense against cyber-attacks and malware [129, 118] and and
medical image processing[36, 6, 37]. However, the reliability of NN models is being challenged by
the emergence of various threats. One of the most recent attacks involves the insertion of Trojan
behaviour, through the training pipeline, into an NN model [42, 81]. This type of attack, also
known as the Trojan attack, results in a Trojan model that behaves normally for clean inputs but
misclassifies inputs that contain a trigger [18, 59, 148, 8]; where the knowledge of the trigger and
incorrect target label is securely guarded by the attacker.
Efforts have been made to detect and defend against Trojan attacks. Early works [121] for detection
assume access to training data, both clean and triggered. Furthermore, attempts such as [127, 44,
101] try to estimate the trigger or the distribution of triggers for a model. The common assumption
among these studies is that the trigger size is known, which is not pragmatic in real-world scenarios.
A major bottleneck in this line of research is the lack of a large-scale benchmark dataset, consisting
of clean and Trojan models. Creating such a dataset is challenging because each data sample must
be a high performance trained model and each model must be trained from scratch to avoid dataset
bias. Without a common public benchmark, researchers report their findings based on limited
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Trojan attack scenarios; sometimes with optimistic assumptions discussed above.
In this chapter, we introduce Odysseus1 , the most diverse public dataset to date that contains over
3,000 clean and Trojaned models. To generate this dataset, various types of triggers and mappings
(source to target class) have been used. Odysseus contains a total of 3,460 models, over 1,000
models each trained on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10 image datasets.
Our second contribution is a comprehensive study of various factors involved in launching a suc-
cessful attack along with analysing the effect of Trojaning process on the intrinsic properties of
neural networks. We employ both NIST TrojAI[1] challenge dataset and the proposed Odysseus
dataset for this analysis. Our analysis shows that the Trojaning process can affect the average clas-
sifier margin and also modifies the shape of the decision boundary around the manifold of clean
samples. The Trojaning process creates a dominant direction in the perturbation space such that
perturbing the images along that direction causes misclassification. In Figure 6.1(b), we show the
schematic of decision boundary B of a non-linear binary classifier for clean and Trojan models
with different label mappings. For a clean model to misclassify, different samples need to be per-
turbed in different directions in R2 as shown by the dotted arrows. As for a Trojan model, samples
can be perturbed along the x axis (dominant direction) to project them on to the decision boundary
for misclassification.
As our third contribution, we propose a detector that determines whether a DNN model is Trojan
or not. For a given model, our Trojan detector tries to estimate the dominant perturbation direc-
tion by considering the alignment of perturbations. These perturbations send a small set of clean
samples, taken from the validation set, to the best representative linear decision boundary for the
classifier. Perturbing the rest of the validation samples along that (dominant) direction, with a





Figure 6.1: a-left) Creating a Trojan model involves poisoning P% training samples with a trigger
and changing their corresponding ground truth to target label, known as label mapping. a-right) Af-
ter training, misclassification is activated only by the triggered samples. b) The Trojaning process
also changes the shape of decision boundary, B around the data manifold by creating a dominant
direction in the perturbation space. To misclassify the samples in the clean model, samples should
be perturbed on x-y plane in different directions. For the Trojan models, regardless of the label
mapping type (Many-to-One(M2O) or Many-to-Many (M2M)), perturbing along x direction leads
to misclassification for most of the samples. In M2O mapping, samples of all classes with the
trigger are mapped to one target class, while in M2M mapping, samples of different classes are
mapped to multiple target classes. Triggered samples are marked with red circle.
Figure 6.2: Different types of mappings used in creating Trojan models covering the most likely
possibilities. Mixed mapping is a combination of the others.
Therefore, by setting a threshold for the misclassification rate of perturbed validation samples, we
can easily differentiate between clean and Trojan models. Since our detector evaluates each model




Suppose a user outsources the training of a deep model and the vendor trains the model based on
user specifications such as data type, architecture, required accuracy, etc. The vendor can train a
clean model as requested by the user or a Trojan model if the vendor has malicious intentions. In
the latter case, the vendor/attacker needs to follow specific steps to create a good Trojan model that
is not easily detectable. In this section, we give an overview of Trojan model creation process and
scrutinized different components to launch a successful backdoored model.
6.2.1 Threat Model
For a clear understanding, we first present the threat model from the Attacker (Vendor) and also
the Defender (End-User) perspectives and establish the terminology used in the rest of the paper.
Attacker: Consider the scenario where an attacker trains a deep neural network (DNN), M , based
on a training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}, where xi is a training sample and yi ∈ [1, 2, . . . , c] is the
corresponding ground truth label. Let Mj denote the classifier’s output corresponding to class
j. Now, the attacker injects triggers into P% of the samples and alters their ground-truth labels.







i = At(xi, t), y
′
i = Al(yi),∀(xi, yi) ∈ D
′}
where At(.) is a function that defines the transformation of a clean sample, xi, to its triggered




















where L is the cross entropy loss and D\D′ is the set of clean samples, D′t is the set of triggered
samples, and w is the trainable parameters. An attack is considered successful, if the trained
model M(x,w′) employing the above loss, has high fooling rate, which means it achieves high
classification performance on triggered samples; while the validation accuracy on clean samples is
still on a par with the clean model, M(x; w∗).
Generally speaking, there are three factors that define an attack:
(i) Data Poisoning Ratio defined as P = |D′t|/|D|
(ii) Trigger properties
(iii) Label Poisoning: defines True label to Target label mapping.
Section 6.3 explains these factors in detail. Unlike [18, 97], full control over the training process is
the key to the attacker’s success in creating a Trojan model. Figure 6.1(a) summarizes the process
of creating a Trojan model.
Defender: The defender (end-user) receives the trained model M with parameters w′ , which are
possibly different from the optimal parameters, w∗. The user has a held-out validation dataset, Dv,
to verify whether the model is clean or Trojan. For an unsuspecting user, good accuracy on the
validation set may be sufficient to trust the model.
Hence, the attacker’s goal is to train a Trojan model that is undetectable—has high accuracy on
clean samples, and has high attack success or fooling rate on triggered samples. Whereas the
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Figure 6.3: (left:) Some patch-type trigger patterns used for CIFAR10 (9 out of 47 are shown).
(right:) A Trojan model should obtain same level of validation accuracy as a clean model. In
Odysseus, the average validation accuracy of Trojan models and clean models are almost the same.
We verify this phenomenon for all Trojan models created out of each image datasets.
defender’s goal is to verify if a given model is Trojan or clean by devising a method that operates
without knowledge of the trigger, target class or the data used to train the model. Therefore, it
requires a large numbers of clean and Trojan models to investigate their discriminative features.
This motivates us to develop a new dataset, referred to as Odysseus.
6.3 Odysseus Dataset
Odysseus is the most diverse dataset of its kind to date comprising over 3,400 benign and Trojan
models. First, we focus on the elements that are necessary to create triggered images and then
briefly describe the policy for creating a good Trojan model.
6.3.1 Trigger Properties
Trigger is a vital element in creating a Trojan model. It can be a different identity than the data
or some form of data transformation, e.g. filtering. Sometimes, triggers are unnoticeable by the
human observer and appear to be a natural part of the image, such as a hat worn by a person or
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graffiti done on an object [34, 44]. Effective triggers must never or rarely appear in the operating
environment giving the attacker full control over when to deploy them. This is to ensure that
the Trojan is not accidentally discovered by the user and does not get triggered unless explicitly
intended by the attacker. This ability of control makes a Trojan attack distinguishable from an
adversarial attack [116]; where the attacker does not have full control over the visual scene.
In this work, we categorize the Trojan models based on the trigger insertion mechanism. First
category of Trojan models uses patch type trigger that will be stamped to the clean image. However,
patch-based triggers needs to be crafted with care for the attack to be successful. Therefore, while
designing them, the factors one should take into consideration are-
Figure 6.4: Color filters used as triggers for creating Trojan models. We employ 4 of them in our
dataset.
Trigger Color: Generally, deep models employed for image classification tasks deal with images
79
Figure 6.5: (left:) Data poisoning ratio vs classification success rate. For a Trojan model, higher
data poisoning ratio yields an increase in attack success rate while decreasing the success rate for
clean samples or validation accuracy. (right:) Based on the mapping Al(.), trigger size affects
the fooling rate differently. Larger trigger tends to increase the fooling rate for M2O attack and
decrease the rate for Mixed and M2M attacks.
of different colors. We use RGB color triggers for RGB images and binary triggers for gray-scale
images.
Trigger Size: we set the area of the trigger to be 1% to 3% of the full image area. However, we
also use larger triggers than this for some of the models, for detection purpose.
Trigger Location: Apart from size and color, the location of the trigger plays an important role
in designing an Trojan attack. In our work, the trigger can be located anywhere in the image.
We prefer random location because if the triggers are always at the same pixel location in all
samples then the model may end up memorizing that location rather than the trigger pattern itself.
Moreover, if triggers appear at random locations in the image, this would cause more variations
within the input data that must be learned by the model. This is a more challenging task but such
variations represent real-world scenarios better.
Trigger Shape: As for the trigger shape, there are no specific rules. Some triggers can be more
stealthy, e.g hard to detect, than others due to their shapes. Therefore, the attacker can choose
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trigger shapes based on their stealthiness, as the network will eventually learn them.
Based on above properties, we create 47 different types of trigger patterns in our dataset. Some of
these patch-based triggers are shown in Fig. 6.3.
The second category of Trojan models are based on different color filters. These filters modify
the whole image in contrast to triggers that are stamped to the clean image. Fig. 6.4 shows the
type of filters we employed in our dataset- Nasville, Gotham, Lomo and Kelvin filters. Learning
from filter-based triggers could be tricky as they heavily augment the clean image. Therefore, it
is harder to obtain high validation accuracy on clean samples. In our experiment, we observed a
slight decrease in validation accuracy for filter-based triggers in contrast to patch-based triggers.
6.3.2 Data and Label Poisoning
In label-poisoning attack, along with the data poisoning using triggers, it is also required to modify
the label of the triggered data.
6.3.2.1 Label Poisoning or Mapping, Al(.)
There exists different types of attacks based on the true label to target label mapping. It is a signifi-
cant part of the Trojaning process as it embodies the objective of an attacker. Moreover, inspection
of a model sometimes heavily depends on the mapping type that was used during training. For
instance, the Trojan detector proposed by [67] only works for Many-to-One label mapping. The
mappings incorporated in creating Trojan models of Odysseus are depicted in Fig. 6.2. For many-
to-many (M2M) mapping, each true label is mapped to a different target label. A simpler mapping,
many-to-one (M2O), changes all true labels of the triggered data to a fixed target label. Another
type of mapping we introduce is Mixed, a combination of M2M, M2O and clean. That means some
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of the classes are not attacked at all, i.e. ”class 1” in Fig. 6.2. In contrast to our dataset, previous
works [15] related to Trojan or backdoor attack only focus on the M2O mapping and it’s varia-
tions such as one-to-one mapping. Generally, M2O attacks result in higher fooling rate compared
to other type of attacks. Given the randomized nature of those two attacks, it may require more
triggered samples to achieve a high fooling rate.
6.3.2.2 Data Poisoning Ratio, P
How well a model learns each mapping often depends on the size of D′t. We use three image
datasets, CIFAR10 [70], Fashion MNIST [134], and MNIST [74]. From the train and test set of
each dataset, only P% of the clean samples are poisoned with trigger, where P stands for data
poisoning ratio. Setting the value of P is a trade off between good performance on clean samples
and high fooling rate. Figure 6.5 shows the effect of data poisoning ratio on fooling rate. As we
increase the data poisoning ratio, it results in higher success rate. However, the size of D is fixed,
there are fewer clean samples available to learn from. This in turn poses another challenge in
achieving high validation accuracy. For example, we obtain an attack success rate of 93.78% for
a data poisoning ratio of 0.4 . For the same ratio, the drop in validation accuracy is close to 1%.
On the other hand, if P is very small (e.g. < 0.1), the fooling rate gets affected due to insufficient
number of triggered samples for a successful attack. Compared to attack success rate, the steeper
slope of validation accuracy curve suggests that higher value of P leads to larger drop in validation
accuracy than gain in attack success rate. Therefore, we set the value of P in the range of 15% and
20%.
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6.3.3 Effect of Trigger Size
There is another factor that affects the fooling rate. To demonstrate this effect, we conduct ex-
periments with different sized triggers. We only consider patch-based triggers as the filter-based
triggers covers the whole image anyway. Fig. 6.5 shows the relationship between trigger size and
attack success rate or fooling rate. Here, we present the fooling rate for different ratio of trigger
area to the whole image area (% of whole image). Note that, a ratio of 0% indicates that there is
no trigger in the image. Therefore, we exclude the comparison for this ratio. We also consider
individual mapping type separately as averaging over them may lead to wrong direction. In case
of M2M and Mixed type of attacks, larger trigger size reduces the fooling rate of a Trojan model
which follows our expectation. Due to the random trigger locations, the model must learn joint
features form the trigger and the object. As the trigger size increases, it covers a larger area of
the main object and the learned features for the triered samples are more biased toward trigger,
features which is shared among all classes. This in turns reduces the fooling rate of the attack. On
the other hand, M2O type attack benefits from larger trigger size since all classes are mapped to
the same target class and larger trigger creates a more prominent feature for the model to learn.
6.3.4 Model Creation and Validation
We use four well-known architectures namely DenseNet [113], GoogleNet [53], VGG19 [117], and
ResNet18 [47] for CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST datasets and four shallow custom designed CNN
models for MNIST dataset. We have created a total of 3,460 models in Odysseus, where roughly
half of the models are clean. The average validation accuracy (VA) of clean and Trojan models
are shown in Fig. 6.3-right; the accuracies are similar as expected. We consider a Trojan model
to be invalid if its VA is not close (e.g. 2% difference) to the VA of a clean model. Details of the
architectures and training process hyper parameters are presented in the supplementary material.
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Besides Odysseus, there are only two other recently released public Trojan datasets. The first one
is the NIST TrojAI[1]-[4] challenge dataset that has four subparts. The Round-0 and Round-1 parts
contain 1200 clean and Trojan models for 5 class image classification. Round-2 includes a more
diverse set of 1000 clean and Trojan models with number of classes in the 5 to 25 range. NIST
Round-3 models are similar to Round-2 except that the models are trained based on the adversarial
training strategies. All rounds only cover many-to-one type of label mapping and it’s variations i.e.
one-to-one and two-to-one mappings. The second dataset is the publicly available portion of the
Universal Litmus Pattern (ULP) [67] dataset which contains 3600 clean and Trojan models trained
on CIFAR10 and Tiny-ImageNet datasets. ULP dataset only contains a single model architecture
and only one-to-one mapping.
6.4 Trojaning Analysis
We believe that insinuating a back door into a neural network would leave some specific patterns,
irrespective of factors such as trigger properties, dataset, and model architecture. In this section,
we aim to analyze the effect of Trojan insertion on some of the intrinsic NN properties, such as
classifier margin and shape of decision boundary around the manifold of clean data. Our findings
reveal distinctive but shared features among Trojan models, which are the key to our proposed
Trojan detector.
6.4.1 Classifier Margin
Classifier margin has been used as an indicator of model robustness and it is well established that
a maximum margin classifier is less sensitive to the worst case model or input perturbation [22].
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The margin of a classifier M(x; w) is defined as follows:
Margin(M) = Ex∼Qdata‖Tx‖2 (6.1)
where the expectation is over the samples, x, from the manifold of training data, Qdata; and ‖Tx‖2
is the distance of the sample x from its nearest point on the decision boundary of M .
Let M(x) = wTx + b be an affine binary classifier with the decision boundary B defined as
B = {x|M(x; w) = 0}, (6.2)
Tx can be computed by orthogonally projecting x onto the hyperplane B. The orthogonal pro-
jection problem has a closed-form solution and the projected point xt can be computed as: xt =
x + Tx. Where Tx is defined as Tx = − w||w||2
M(x)
||w||2 . Here, the first ratio indicates the opposite
direction of the normal to the decision boundary, along which sample x should move, whereas the
second term is the distance to the decision boundary. For non-linear cases, there is no exact solu-
tion for Tx. However, we employ the iterative process, proposed by DeepFool [93], to approximate
the minimum perturbation that sends an image x to the nearest decision boundary.
In case of a non-linear binary differentiable classifier, Tx can be estimated by iteratively perturbing
the sample x until it falls over the decisions boundary. In each iteration i, the non-linear classifier
is linearized by the tangent hyperplane to the classifier at the point xi. This makes the problem
solvable by the orthogonal projection of sample xi onto the tangent hyperplane. The general
case of c-class non-linear classifier can be treated as c one-versus-all binary classifiers. Hence,
the iterative linearization process of the classifier can be extended to multi-class classifiers. The








Bj, Bj = (6.3)
{x|Mj(xi)−Mk(xi) +∇Mj(xi)Tx−∇Mk(xi)Tx = 0},
where Mj(.) is the output score of the classifier for the class j and Bj is the decision hyperplane
between class k and j. Now the nearest decision boundary to the point xi can be found by solving
the following minimization problem












The iterative process continues as long as the predicted label for the perturbed sample xi + txi is
still the same as the original sample x0, i.e, k(xi+1) = k(x0). Finally, the projection vector that





It is worth noting that the vector Tx can be considered as normal to the decision boundary of the
classifier at point x + Tx.
2We refer to l(xi) as l for brevity.
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Table 6.1: Estimated average margin of each dataset using the iterative process.
Dataset Clean M2O M2M Mixed
NIST R-0[1] 5.73 3.44 - -
MNIST 1.06 0.8460 0.8957 0.8828
CIFAR10 0.9183 0.8936 0.9743 0.9733
FashionMNIST 0.2692 0.2433 0.2845 0.27
We employ this iterative process to compute the average margin for the NIST R-0, Odysseus
datasets using the complete validation set for each model. Table 6.1 summarizes the average mar-
gin for the both of these datasets. Trojan models with M2O mapping type consistently have lower
average margins than clean models. Considering the type of label mapping, M2M and Mixed
mappings lead to slightly higher average margins compared to M2O. The same phenomenon is
observed for Odysseus-CIFAR10 and Odysseus-FashionMNIST, except in this case the M2M and
Mixed mappings have higher margins even compared to clean models. The reason for this excep-
tion is clarified in the next section.
6.4.2 Model Complexity
We investigate the complexity of Trojan models by analyzing the changes, caused by Trojaning,
in the non-linearity of decision boundary around the manifold of clean samples. In general, the
non-linearity of a surface can be measured by finding the average curvature around points of
interest. The closer this value is to zero, the more linearized the surface is. Formally, for the twice
differentiable hyper-surface decision boundary B of a model M , this measure is defined as
κB = Ex∼Qdataκx, (6.7)
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where κx is the first principle curvature of B at point x; which is also defined as the first singular
value of the Hessian(B(x)). However, finding κx can be computationally intensive due to the
complex nature of required operations. To bypass this problem, we devise a proxy to estimate the
shape of the decision boundary by exploiting the correlation among the normal vectors to B(x)
around the manifold of clean samples and analyzing the properties of the perturbation space S that
contains the normal vectors.
For a sample x ∈ Rd, where d is the dimension of input image, the vector Tx ∈ Rd as defined
in Eq. (6.6) is the normal vector to B at point x + Tx. To find the basis of the space S, first we




· · · Txn
‖Txn‖2
] .
Note that it is preferred that the number of samples n, to be at least equal to the dimension d.
The dimensionality and the scaling of the space along each coordinate axis can be found from the
non-zero elements of matrix Σ (the singular values of S). There are two extreme cases. (1) When
all normal vectors Txi‖Txi‖2 are parallel, Σ has only one non-zero singular value, so the energy of the
space S is concentrated in one direction hence, the decision boundary is linear.
(2) When matrix Σ is close to identity which means that Txi‖Txi‖2 are completely independent and
the energy of the space S is distributed uniformly in all directions, So B has the maximum non-
linearity around manifold of clean data.
For the cases in between, the more concentrated energy is in the few directions, the more similar
the decision boundary would be to a linear decision boundary.
We create matrix S for all of the clean and Trojan models of Odysseus CIFAR-10 and Fashoin-
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Figure 6.6: The first 100 singular values of matrix S scaled by the first singular value σi/σ1.
MNIST datasets using 600 and 300 samples per class from the validation set, respectively.
Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of the first 100 singular values based on the label mapping aver-
aged over all of the CIFAR-10 models. For ease of comparison, we scale all singular values with
the first one. Now, each singular value represents the importance of that coordinate axis compared
to the first coordinate axis. The analysis of the distribution of singular values reveals the following
findings: (I): The space S has a significantly lower dimension than d i.e. dim(S) d II): The first
few singular values have a similar energy pattern in all type of models. However, in the Trojan
models regardless of the mapping type, the contribution of the remaining singular values in the to-
tal energy of the space S decreases more rapidly compared to clean models. Note that in Figure 6.6
the red (Many-to-Many mapping) and blue (Many-to-One mapping) curves are consistently below
the curve of clean models. This suggests that for the Trojan models, the normal vectors are more
aligned with each other and also if we orthogonally project them onto the subspace S ′ created by
the basis correspond to the dominant singular values of S, the projected vector are also aligned. In
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Figure 6.7: Top: Decision boundary B of a Trojan model with M2O label mapping. The normal
vectors to B (solid arrows) are aligned with the subspace S ′ with the dominant direction along
x-axis. Bottom: Decision boundary B of a Trojan model with M2M label mapping. The subspace
S ′ is along the z-axis with normal vectors parallel to it. In both cases, the non-linear B can be
replaced with linear Bl with dominant direction in S
′ as its normal.
other words, Trojan insertion creates a dominant direction from samples toward decision boundary
B in S ′ . Figure 6.7 shows the schematic representation of normal vectors to the decision boundary
B ∈ R3 along with the corresponding subspace S ′ for Many-to-One (M2O) and Many-to-Many
(M2M) mappings. In M2O mapping, the subspace S ′ is the x-y plane with x-axis as the dominant
direction toward the decision boundary. For M2M mapping, the subspace S ′ is along the z-axis
and the normals are parallel to it. The Bl is a linear decision boundary that can replace the B with
the dominant direction in S ′ as its normal vector.
III): Trojan insertion can affect the non-linearity of decision boundary differently based on the type
of attack one uses. For M2O mapping, the first 100 singular values cover 2% less energy compared
to that of clean models that suggests this type of mapping slightly increases the non-linearity of B.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.8: 3D visualization of output logits for 40 clean samples per class for models from CIFAR-10 dataset.
Here, ci → j indicates the True label, i, to Target label, j, mapping. a) Clean model, b) A M2O Trojan model with
Target class 7. c) A M2M Trojan model.
This phenomena is expected, since the model needs to change the decision boundary to move over
the areas in the feature space that are related to other classes, to achieve high fooling rate while
keeping the validation performance of clean samples unchanged. However, in M2M mapping the
first 100 singular values covering 3% more energy compared to clean models. This observation
suggests that this type of mapping slightly decreases the non-linearity of the decision boundary. We
believe that, since each True label only maps to one Target label and the poisoning ratio is small,
15%− 20%, the triggered samples act like hard negative samples during training and increases the
margin as reported in Table 6.1.
To verify this, we also visualize the output logits of 40 clean samples per class for models CIFAR-
10 dataset based on different source to target label mappings on 3D space. Figure 6.8(c) shows
distinctive clusters for each class compared to a clean model in Figure 6.8(a) and Figure 6.8(b)
shows the samples of target class 7 are spread over a larger space even in 3D space. In the next
chapter, we use these findings as the basis of the proposed Trojan detector.
91
6.5 Trojan Detector
The detector is inspired by our finding in Section 6.4 that Trojaning can create a dominant direction
in the perturbation space around the manifold of clean data.This finding implies that the non-linear
decision boundary, B, can be better represented by a linearized one, Bl, around Qdata with the
dominant direction in the perturbation space as its normal vector. Since the perturbation directions
Txi that project samples xi to the closest point on the non-linear decision boundary are more
aligned, the normal direction to Bl can be found by considering the directions of few samples
for a Trojan model. Now, if we perturb samples along the normal direction of Bl with a certain
magnitude, since it is close to the shortest path from samples to the decision boundary for Trojan
models, it causes a higher misclassification rate for Trojan models compared to clean models.
Our Trojan detector consists of two components. The first one is responsible for finding the normal
vector to the best representative linearized decision boundary around a small batch of samples X ∈
Qdata, that is scaled to a given magnitude, ξ. The output of first step is the detector perturbation
vector rX that maps X to the linearized decision boundary of M . In the second step, all the
samples in the held-out validation set Dv\X are perturbed with the detector perturbation rX as
D′v = {(xi + rX,yi)|(xi,yi) ∈ Dv\X}.The detector considers the Error rate of the model M on
samples of D′v, denoted as Err(M(D
′
v)), to differentiate between clean and Trojan models. The
detector function Detector(M) labels the model M as Trojan if Err(M(D′v)) ≥ δ, and label it
as clean otherwise. Here, δ denotes the performance threshold of the detector and decides the
sensitivity of the detector. The proposed Trojan detector is presented in Algorithm 1.
Note that the detector perturbation procedure in Algorithm 1 is similar to universal adversarial
perturbation (UAP) [92] in the sense that both aim to compute a direction in the perturbation
space based on a batch of data, X, that causes the misclassification for all the samples. However,
our method is inherently different in how they compute the direction. UAP finds the direction
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sequentially by aggregating the minimal perturbations that sends the current sample xi that has
been perturbed by UAP perturbation v to the decision boundary of the classifier. While Algorithm
1 tries to find the normal to the linear decision boundary Bl by emphasizing on the alignment of
normal vectors to the classifier decision boundary B in Trojan models. Since this feature is more
prominent in Trojan models, the detector perturbation becomes a stronger attack to Trojan models
and leads to larger drop in the accuracy compared to clean models.
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Algorithm 1 Trojan Detector
1: Input: Validation set Dv, classifier M , magnitude of the perturbation ξ, threshold of error rate
for perturbed input batch ρ, maximum iteration J, performance threshold δ
2: Output: Detector decision (Clean / Trojan)
3: Step 1:
4: Select image batch X randomly from Dv
5: Initialize i← 0, j ← 0, rX ← 0
6: while j ≤ J and Err(M(X + rX)) ≤ ρ do
7: for each image xi ∈ X do
8: compute txi+rX using Eq. (6.5) / Perturbation that projects xi + rX onto the nearest point on
Blinearized Eq. (6.3)
9: end for





/ normal vector to Bl
11: rX ← ξ rX‖rX‖2 / scale the normal vector to magnitude ξ
12: j ← j + 1
13: end while
14: Step 2:
15: Create perturbed validation set: D′v = {Dv\X}+ rX






Table 6.2: Accuracy of the proposed Trojan detectors on Odysseus for different true label to target label mappings.
Dataset Clean M2O M2M Mixed
MNIST 80.2±2.8 91.8±5.1 92.7±2.8 96.4±4.7
FashionMNIST 100± 0 81.6±7.8 74.7±6.9 71.0±8.3
CIFAR10 99.5±0.5 96.1±2.2 99.4±1.08 97.8±3.0
6.6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the quality of the Odysseus dataset followed by the performance and
generalizability of the proposed Trojan detector.
6.6.1 Performance on Odysseus
In the first set of experiments we evaluate the performance of the proposed Trojan detector on our
Odysseus dataset. The 5-fold cross validation accuracy of the detector for clean and different label
mapping is reported in Table 6.2. For all parts of Odysseus, we set the error rate threshold ρ = 0.5
and the maximum iteration J = 10. The magnitude of perturbation ξ is set to 5 for gray-scale
images of MNIST and Fashion-MNIST and 10 for CIFAR10. Finally, rX is computed based on 40
samples per class with performance threshold of δ = 0.5. As it can be seen, the proposed Trojan
detector sets a high baseline on Odysseus even with almost fixed set of hyperparameters.
To benchmark the complexity of our new dataset, we compare the performance of the sate of the
art (SOTA) Trojan detectors on the Odysseus-CIFAR10 in Table 6.4. The Universal Litmus Pattern
(ULP) [67] and Meta-Neural Trojan Detection (MNTD) [136] are training-based detection meth-
ods that train a classifier based on the features extracted from clean and Trojan models. MNTD
is a blackbox method that requires many shadow benign and Trojan models to learn the decision
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Table 6.3: Performance of the proposed Trojan detector.
Dataset Precision Recall Accuracy(%)
NIST R-0 [1] 0.851±0.05 0.928±0.02 85.00±3.78
NIST R-1 [2] 0.924±0.02 0.753±0.02 83.40±0.80
NIST R-2 [3] 0.79±7.73 0.730±0.04 72.96±4.37
CIFAR10 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
MNIST 0.818±0.01 0.936±0.01 86.36±1.11
FashionMNIST 1.000±0.00 0.715±0.04 85.29±2.23
ULP-TinyImageNet 0.790± 0.09 0.690±0.02 75.61±1.38
Table 6.4: Performance of SOTA Trojan detectors on Odysseus-CIFAR10.
Method Precision Recall Accuracy(%)
ULP [67] 0.780±0.33 0.518±0.36 68.63 ±1.49
STRIP [38] 0.958±0.02 0.360±0.01 67.32±1.31
MNTD [136] 1.000±0.00 0.850±0.01 92.50±0.16
NC [127] 0.854±0.02 0.408±0.01 66.83±1.76
Ours 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
boundary of the target model. For a fair comparison with other methods, we use it as a whitebox
detector. We use 80% of data for training and evaluate on the rest. Even after considering 10 litmus
patterns, we believe that the poor performance of ULP is due to its weakness in finding ULP pat-
terns for cross architecture models. MNTD performs significantly better than ULP as a whitebox
detector. It’s 92.50% accuracy is the second best to our method. Applying MNTD as its orig-
inal blackbox detection mode drops its performance to 64.16%. Strong Intentional Perturbation
(STRIP)[38] is an online defensive method and assumes that Trojan models are input agnostic in
the presence of a trigger.The reason for the poor performance of STRIP is that the image agnostic
assumption only holds for fixed trigger position Trojan models. While in Odysseus, the Trojan
models are trained based on random trigger positions. Neural Cleanse (NC) uses optimization to
generate a minimal trigger pattern for each label. In Table 6.5, we compare the performance of
these methods along with our proposed detector on other datasets.
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Table 6.5: Detection Accuracy (%) of SOTA Trojan detectors on various datasets. STRIP is not
applicable to NIST datasets since there is no triggered samples available for them. For TinyIma-
geNet, performance of the ULP is reported based on our re-run.
Method NIST R-0 NIST R-1 NIST R-2 TinyImageNet
ULP [67] 62.51 56.87 54.00 96.50
STRIP [38] N/A N/A N/A 48.18
MNTD [136] 65.14 57.50 49.00 53.40
NC [127] 65.02 57.71 57.07 67.64
Ours 85 83.40 72.96 75.61
6.6.2 Performance on Other Datasets
We also evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed Trojan detector on the two other public datasets
namely NIST [1]-[4] and ULP [67]. For the NIST round-0 and round-1, we used 40 samples per
class to compute the perturbation with maximum number of iteration J = 10. The rest of the
hyper parameters is the same as Odysseus-CIFAR10. For the NIST round-2 dataset, since the
dataset provides limited validation set for each model, we used 5 samples per class to compute
the perturbation and set the performance threshold δ = 15. The reported performance in Table
6.3 demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed Trojan detector as it successfully detects Trojan
models regardless of the dataset. The best performance is achieved on Odysseus-CIFAR10 with
close to 99% accuracy in detection. We believe the scarce number of limitation set for NIST R-2
is the reason for drop in the accuracy compared to other datasets.
6.6.3 Unseen Scenarios
Finally we compare the performance of Trojan detectors against three complicated unseen scenar-
ios, namely new triggers, regularized models and adversarially trained models. For new triggers,
we train 12 Trojan models per mapping with various filters as Trigger (Fig. 6.4) for CIFAR10
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Table 6.6: Accuracy (%) of the proposed Trojan detector on new scenarios. We employ different type of color
filters as triggers for CIFAR10-Filter models. For CIFAR10-Noise, noise has been used as regularizer during training.
NIST-R3[4] models are adverserally trained.
Method CIFAR10-Filter CIFAR10-Noise NIST R-3[4]
ULP [67] 62.85±2.19 60.93±4.41 53.39±3.54
MNTD [136] 61.42±1.41 71.87±3.05 46.60±0.38
Ours 96.92±3.76 84.60±6.80 61.09±4.01
dataset. For regularized models, we trained in total 160 clean and Trojan models with noise as the
regularizer to make them robust against random perturbations. We also test the detectors against
adversarially robust models of NIST-R3[4] dataset.
Table 6.6 reports the performance for each scenarios. The proposed detector shows higher gener-
alizability compare to other methods in all scenarios and performs well on new triggers with less
than 2% drops in accuracy compared to known triggers. The worst performance of our detector
is against adversarially trained models of NIST-R3[4] dataset. Considering the small-sized valida-
tion set of each model, we could only use 5 samples per class to find the dominant perturbation
direction which is not enough to recover the correct direction. Furthermore, we believe that the
degradation of performance, in both regularized models and adversarially trained models, is related
to their effect on the shape of decision boundary.
6.6.4 Ablation Study
While in this section we study the effect of each one of the hyper-parameters in the Trojan detector
on its performance, we would like to note that our results for Odysseus are reported based on the
almost fixed set of hyper parameters. So the detector performs well without meticulous hyper
parameters tuning.
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In the first set of experiments we study the effect of performance threshold δ on the detector while
other parameters are set to ξ = 10 and ρ = 0.5. Table 6.7 summarizes the study. Large values for
δ negatively affect recall while small values decreases the precision drastically. For models with
more than 0.95 accuracy, 0.4≤ δ ≤0.6 leads to a good performance. This range is the margin of
accuracy drop between clean and Trojan models. The wide range shows that our detector is not
overly sensitive to the chosen values.
Table 6.7: Effect of δ on the final performance of the proposed Trojan detector for Odysseus-
CIFAR10 dataset
δ Precision Recall Accuracy%
0.8 1.00±0.00 0.721±0.04 84.85±2.57
0.7 1.00±0.00 0.823±0.03 90.38 ±2.06
0.6 1.00±0.00 0.913±0.01 95.24±0.99
0.5 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
0.4 0.98±0.014 0.98±0.016 98.05±0.75
0.3 0.845±0.011 0.98±0.009 89.51±0.38
0.2 0.559±0.018 0.996±0.004 57.08±1.67
To analysis the effect of magnitude of perturbation ξ on the detector, we set the performance
threshold δ = 0.5 and the error rate to ρ = 0.5. If ξ is set to a large value the performance of both
clean and Trojan models on the validation set would drop drastically so it is hard to differentiate
between clean and Trojan models. On the other hand, for the small values of ξ, the performance
of both clean and Trojan models on the validation set would not change that much which causes a
similar miss-classification rate for both groups. The performance of the detector based on various
values of ξ is presented in the Table 6.8.
Finally, we evaluate the effect of error rate threshold ρ on the detector. Table 6.9 compares the
performance of the proposed detector for various values of ρ while ξ = 10 and δ = 0.5. Setting ρ
to a small error rate; ρ < 0.5; decreases the performance more significantly than setting it to the
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Table 6.8: Effect of ξ on the final performance of the proposed Trojan detector for Odysseus-
CIFAR10 dataset
ξ Precision Recall Accuracy%
5 1.00±0.00 0.30±0.05 63.76±3.04
7.5 0.97±0.01 0.543±0.04 76.05 ±2.89
10 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
12.5 0.67±0.029 0.76±0.05 69.44±0.68
15 0.59±0.07 0.80±0.033 60.74±2.59
large one; ρ > 0.5. Since the Trojan models would still have high performance on the perturbed
validation set D′v, the detector labels them as clean models. The random performance; 53%; of the
detector with very low recall rate of 0.09% for ρ = 0.3 indicates this phenomena.
Table 6.9: Effect of ρ on the final performance of the proposed Trojan detector for Odysseus-
CIFAR10 dataset
ρ Precision Recall Accuracy%
0.7 0.84±0.025 0.896±0.02 86.51±1.87
0.6 0.85±0.01 0.89±0.02 86.6 ±1.51
0.5 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
0.4 0.92±0.07 0.25±0.047 60.91±1.10
0.3 0.91±0.07 0.09±0.044 53.39±1.37
6.7 Summary
We proposed Odysseus, the most diverse public Trojan dataset with more than 3000 models. Our
analysis on this dataset shows that increasing the Trigger’s size adversely affects fooling rate of
Trojan models with M2M and Mix label mapping. In addition, analysis of the intrinsic properties
of Trojan models revealed that (M2O) mapping consistently reduces the average margin and Trojan
insertion process creates a dominant direction in the perturbation space. Taking these two proper-
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ties into consideration, we proposed a Trojan detector that works without any information about
the attack or training data and sets a high baseline accuracy; for Odysseus. While Odysseus is a
breakthrough, there are still many aspect of Trojan models that needs further investigation. Effect
of data augmentation methods and regularizers on the success of Trojan attacks and also intrinsic
properties of Trojan models, behaviour of Trojan classifiers with high resolution input and more
output classes, mitigation of Trojan attacks are few to name.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter we present the concluding remarks on the effect of manifold assumption on various
applications in computer vision.
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, first we explored the effect of manifold assumption in stabilizing the train-
ing process of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) by proposing a new learning paradigm
that benefits from the geodesic distance of samples to compare the quality of generated and fake
images. We theoretically prove the distributional consistency between the generated samples and
real images. We further demonstrate the superiority of this method on semi-supervised image
classification with limited labeled samples.
In CapProNet model, we address the problem of modeling a manifold through a group of cap-
sule subspaces instead of single vectors. We demonstrate that capsules created by orthogonally
projecting the input features onto these learned capsule subspaces can improve the performance
of the model and achieve the intra-class invariance in detecting the presence of an entity against
appearance variations, as well as model the equivalence of the instantiation parameters of entities
by encoding them into capsule orientations.
We further extend the idea of subspace capsules to incorporate them in the intermediate layers
of a model. To this end, we propose a loss less decomposition of orthogonal projection matrix
that allows the creation of various size subspace capsule without the loss of information. We
also demonstrate how using subspace capsules in the generator of GAN framework improves the
diversity and quality of generated samples.
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Finally in Odyssey, we address the reliability of deep learning model by analysing their behaviour
around the manifold of data. Specifically, we are interested in detecting a special case of adversarial
attacks called Trojan (backdoored) models. To this end, first we create a dataset of clean and Trojan
models named Odysseus. We analyse the effect of various factors in creating a successful Trojan
model. We also investigate the effect of Trojaning process on the model properties like classifier
margin and shape of decision boundary around the data. Based on our findings, we propose a novel
Trojan model detector that only requires limited number of clean samples to find the perturbation
that leads to larger performance drop in Trojan models compared to clean models.
7.2 Future Works
While the effect of manifold assumption on multiple applications like image generation, (semi-
)supervised classification and Trojan model have been investigated, but there are many other ap-
plications that can benefit from this assumption and need investigation.
Specifically in GAN framework, we need to investigate the efficacy of LSAL on other modalities
specially video generation and semi-supervised classification. The main challenge is how to disen-
tangle the temporal variation from spatial variation on the manifold representation. In other word,
we need to investigate if a global coordinate system can model all the variation in videos.
In subspace capsule network, in addition to extending the idea to more challenging and fine grained
tasks like object detection and semantic segmentation, activity recognition, there other aspects
of it that requires further investigation. It is intuitive to use dynamic capsule size to represent
various objects or part of objects. The effectiveness of Attention mechanism [124] and/or fuzzy
system classifiers [99, 60] to achieve more effective subspace capsules needs further investigation.
In addition to it, as we mentioned in chapter 4, subspace capsule creation can be considered as
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a general case of weight normalization. This property suggests that subspace capsule network
should also stabilize the training process and lead to the faster convergence of the models. In
addition, we hypothesize the independence of the basis in each capsule subspace should lead to
more adversarially robust framework compared to CNN models. All of these hypothesises show
the potential of SCN as a general framework that can replace CNN models for higher performance
and robustness against adversarial attacks.
Finally, while in Odyssey we investigate the effect of various factors in Trojan attacks, these factors
are mostly related to one specific type of attacks named poison label attack. There are other types
of attacks like clean label attacks that require further investigation and require specific Trojan
model detector. In addition, we plan to investigate the effect of graph summarization techniques
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